STUDY OF AUSTRALIA’S APPROACH TO AID IN INDONESIA:
Final Report
A report to
the Panel conducting the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness
28th
February, 2011
Charles Tapp
This report was written by Charles Tapp
following an extensive document review, 10 days in Indonesia
and a week with AusAID, whole of government and NGO staff in Canberra.
Initial findings and recommendations were presented to the Aid
Effectiveness Independent Review team in late January and this final report incorporates
some the team’s observations.
The author would like to thank all those
who gave generously of their time.
Particular thanks are due to Danielle Heinecke, Shannon Rooney, Sofia Ericksson and Fiona McIvor in Canberra,
and Jacqui Delacy, Widy Thajeb and the super-efficient Benita Sommerville in Jakarta. Thanks are also due to Margaret Reid and Bill Farmer from the Aid Effectiveness Independent
Review team who overlapped for some of the author’s time in Jakarta and who provided significant insights
and information.
The contents of this report are the views
of the author only. Given the timeframes
set for the review it was not possible for one person to cover all of the
necessary detail in an objective manner.
Many of the findings and recommendations are, of necessity, subjective
in nature.
Some parts of the report may be interpreted
as critical; this should not in any way be seen as a reflection of the
commitment, professionalism and dedication of AusAID or other Australian
Government staff.
Washington D.C. February 28th
2011
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
PAGE
List of Acronyms 4
1. Executive Summary 5
2. Context and Methodology 6
3. Assessment of the Current Australian Aid
Programme to Indonesia 8
4. Corporate Issues and Obstacles to
Further Scaling up of the Programme 23
5. Recommendations for the Scaling-Up of Australia’s
Aid Programme in Indonesia
and its Improved
Effectiveness 28
Annex I: Terms of
Reference AI-1
Annex II: Summary
of meetings in Indonesia AII-1
Annex III: Summary
of meetings in Australia AIII-1
Annex IV: Summary of
main findings and recommendations AV-1
LIST OF
ACRONYMS
Every attempt has been made to reduce the
use of acronyms in this report.
Unfortunately the development industry suffers from a surfeit of
acronyms, mostly unnecessary. The author
apologises for any gratuitous acronym usage that has unwittingly crept into the
report. The following were deemed
helpful to be included.
ADB Asian
Development Bank
AIFDR Australia-Indonesia
Facility for Disaster Reduction
AIPRD Australia-Indonesia
Partnership for Reconstruction and Development
AUSAID Australian
Agency for International Development
BAPPENAS Indonesian
National Planning Department (also responsible for donor coordination)
DAP Direct
Aid Program (implemented by DFAT, funded by AusAID)
DFAT Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian Government)
DfID Department
for International Development (UK
Government)
EINRIP Eastern Indonesia National Roads Improvement Program
EU European
Union
NGO Non
Governmental Organisation
PAF Performance
Assessment Framework
PM&C Department
of Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australian Government)
PNPM National
Programme for Community Empowerment (Indonesian Government)
REDD Reducing
Emissions through Deforestation and Forest
Degradation
SES Senior
Executive Service of the Australian Government
UN United
Nations
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Australian aid programme to Indonesia is
effective and offers good value for money.
The programme has grown significantly from $120m/year in 2003 to
$450m/year in 2010 and this scale-up has been achieved professionally and with
efficiency. Indeed it is something of a
model for further AusAID scaling up globally in the coming few years. The Government of Indonesia, at the most
senior political and bureaucratic levels, considers Australian assistance to be
excellent and AusAID to be the donor agency of choice. Unquestionably the Australian aid programme
to Indonesia
has had a very positive impact on the bilateral relationship between the two
countries. The proportion of Australian aid funding passing through Indonesian
government systems has increased markedly and AusAID’s programmatic and
financial safeguards are robust. Further
use of government systems is encouraged.
AusAID programmes in the areas of
education, infrastructure, poverty reduction, social protection and economic
governance have been for the most part highly effective. There are no glaring bad programmes in the
other sectors and AusAID has done a good job of closing or re-orienting poorer
performing activities.
UN agencies funded by the aid programme
have tended to perform poorly and the development banks have a mixed
scorecard. While more funding can be,
and should be, channelled through the development banks, AusAID should be more
assertive in demanding better performance.
Overall the aid programme to Indonesia has a
strong performance and results culture, though more can be done to simplify
results frameworks and align them with Indonesian Government indicators.
Australian whole of government aid activity
in Indonesia
is inadequately coordinated and has a proliferation of programmes. Some Australian agencies and departments are
delivering very effective activities, others less so. A significant portion of the aid budget to Indonesia
should be set aside (10%) for a single whole of government competitive fund.
The greatest constraints to future
effectiveness and further growth of the aid programme to Indonesia are
corporate in nature, not programmatic.
Budget, human resources, risk management and corporate information
processes in AusAID need to be reviewed and improved with some urgency if the
agency is to meet the Australian Government’s planned increase in the aid
budget to 0.5% of gross national income by 2015. The timeliness, efficiency and costs of
AusAID design processes leave a great deal to be desired.
The three sectors where significant scale-up can occur effectively,
with widespread use of partner government systems, are education,
infrastructure (including through a second generation of loans) and poverty
reduction/decentralisation. These three
sectors have also been selected by AusAID management for scale-up and the
thinking around how this can be done is generally good.
2.
CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY
The Australian Government has commissioned an Independent Review of
Aid Effectiveness, to be undertaken by a panel of five experts chaired by Mr.
Sandy Hollway. As part of this
Effectiveness Review, the panel has commissioned a number of studies to assist
in the overall analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Australian
aid programme. One of the commissioned
studies is to examine and evaluate the scaling up of the Australian aid
programme to Indonesia,
hence this report. The rationale for
choosing this focus is that the Indonesia programme was the first to scale-up,
courtesy of the $1bn post-tsunami Australia-Indonesia Partnership for
Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD).
It is also now Australia’s
largest bilateral aid programme and is expected to increase in size
significantly over the coming five years in line with the Australian
Government’s commitment to see ODA levels reaching 0.5% of gross national
income by 2015. Please refer to Annex I
of this report for the full terms of reference for the Indonesia
review.
The time-frame for this review of the Indonesia programme was of
necessity short and the methodology was very simple, commencing with a document
review of strategies, evaluations, designs, independent completion reports,
mid-term reviews and other documentation pertinent to the programme. The author then visited Indonesia from
3rd-14th January for consultations with Government of
Indonesia, Australian government and civil society representatives and some
field visits. Consultations were then
held in Canberra from 17th-24th
January with Australian government and civil society representatives (see Annexes
II and III for a summary of consultations in Indonesia and Australia). An interim summary of findings and
recommendations was submitted to the Aid Effectiveness Review Panel on 28th
January (see Annex IV for a summary of the main findings and recommendations
contained in this report). This final
report is submitted to the Panel to support their broader analysis and
deliberations.
Given the time constraints and the fact that the review was
conducted by one person, it has not been possible to delve into great
detail. Many of the findings and
recommendations are unapologetically subjective in nature or rely on
evaluations and assessments of others.
For the purposes of simplicity the report is divided into three main
sections:
i)
An assessment of the current
Australian aid programme to Indonesia and the lessons learned from the process
of scaling up over the past five years;
ii)
Corporate issues and obstacles
faced in a further scaling up of the programme over the coming five years.
iii)
Recommendations on modifications,
emphases and improvements necessary to the current aid effort to facilitate
greater effectiveness in the context of an expected further increase in the
size of the aid programme to Indonesia.
Most of the findings
and recommendations apply to AusAID given that it is responsible for over 80%
of Australian aid to Indonesia. Specific
recommendations are included for other whole of government aid contributions. While efforts were made to cover other
Australian government department activities in Indonesia, this was extremely
difficult since there are over 100 separate projects outside of the AusAID
budget. Accordingly, the bulk of this
report applies to AusAID and its work, which in itself highlights a problem
with the dispersed and un-coordinated nature of Australian government aid
funding and activity in Indonesia. It
should not be taken that this report, by omission, considers much of the work
done by other government departments to be good or successful. On the contrary, for the most part the information
is simply not available.
This report makes no
judgements as to the rate or scale of overall further increases in the size of
the Australian aid budget to Indonesia.
It simply accepts that there will be a significant increase.
This report assumes a
level of knowledge of the Australian aid programme to Indonesia and will not
provide an outline for the reader. For
background information please consult the AusAID website: www.ausaid.gov.au.
3.
Assessment of the Current
Australian Aid Programme to Indonesia
3.1 The scaling up of the aid programme to Indonesia (from $120m/year in 2003 to $450m/year in 2010) has for the most part been achieved
successfully, both in terms of overall effectiveness and efficiency. Since the last evaluation in 2007
(“Assessment of the Indonesia Country Program Strategy 2003-2006”, conducted by
Chris Hoban, Charles Tapp and Helen Moody), AusAID has made impressive progress
in its policy influence and leadership, delivery strategies (especially the
greater use of Government of Indonesia systems) and reaching larger numbers of
poor people throughout the country.
AusAID in Indonesia has been very well led at the Minister Counsellor
level and also at the Assistant Secretary level in Canberra.
The scaling up of the AusAID programme has been rapid, triggered by
the $1bn financial commitment by the Australian Government following the
appalling 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. The
2007 evaluation cited the unprecedented challenge faced by AusAID in scaling
up, delivering new soft loan programmes in education and infrastructure,
dealing with various bombings and security challenges, plus juggling the
demands of the Indonesian Government’s decentralisation programme. These challenges were immediately compounded
by the tragic and untimely death of Alison Sudradjat, the inspirational AusAID
Minister Counsellor, in an air crash.
The 2007 evaluation stated “By any standards, the response of the
Australian aid program, in the face of these events and of AusAID and other
government agencies in Indonesia in managing through this tumultuous period was
outstanding.” While the past four years
have been a little less tumultuous, the performance of AusAID and many other
government departments has continued at the highest level.
3.2 The Country Strategy for the period 2008-2013
(The Australia Indonesia Partnership Country
Strategy 2008-2013) remains partially
relevant, though there is not full alignment with the Indonesian Government’s
new medium term development plan. While
well conceived and the product of a long and costly consultation process, the
Strategy is not a living document and is not the main guiding force to the aid
programme’s development and evolution. This
questions whether so much time and effort should be put into strategy
development. It would seem to be more
sensible to develop a shorter 10-year broad directional statement and then more
detailed two-year implementation strategies with associated rigorous
performance frameworks.
The Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) for the strategy has not
been followed and does not provide a basis of assessment of success and
effectiveness of the programme. That
said, it is not a particularly well considered performance framework and is
short on sector coherence. Some recent
decisions to expand the programme in new directions, especially the poverty
reduction and social protection work, have been sensible, so the issue is more
the utility of a six-year strategy document as a guide to programme
evolution.
3.3 Programme Focus. The terms of reference for this review
specifically asked for an assessment of the “... extent to which the aid
program suffers from, or has managed to avoid, problems of fragmentation.” Simply put, the current aid programme is too fragmented and requires further
consolidation. AusAID management has
successfully reduced the number of initiatives, activities and agreements
(AusAID language for programmes, projects and contracts) over the past 24
months: the number of initiatives is now 75, compared to 120 in 2009. Whole-of-government activities have
proliferated in the last few years.
However, even for AusAID more consolidation is necessary. Having so many initiatives is not efficient
and demands an unnecessary amount of administration.
3.4 The Government of Indonesia’s view
of the Australian aid programme is very
positive at all levels. Based on
extensive consultations with government officials and ministers (see Annex II),
Australia is repeatedly described as the donor of choice and is viewed as being
responsive to Indonesian needs. That
Australian aid is so well viewed, even in the President’s and Vice President’s
offices, speaks volumes for the level of coordination, collaboration and
engagement between the two governments on aid policy and implementation. The
aid programme clearly has a very positive impact on the bilateral relationship
between the two countries, which is a significant finding. Indonesia and Australia are close neighbours
and the future stability and prosperity of both countries are interlinked at a
number of levels. It is testimony to
considerable hard work from both governments that the Australian aid programme
has such a positive impact: a decade ago the programme comprised a number of
disparate stand-alone projects that were not integrated with Indonesian
Government priorities and initiatives.
While AusAID is now praised for being responsive to needs and flexible,
it is also criticised for its cumbersome and time-consuming programme planning
and design. This issue is taken up
further later in this report.
3.5 There is a very strong commitment to performance
management within AusAID and some good progress is being made. For the most part the
quality and impact of the aid programme to Indonesia is good, with some exceptions
that are captured later in this report. That said, the sector Performance
Assessment Frameworks (PAF) are patchy in both quality and utility, and there
are far too many of them. There is a
lack of consistency in the development of the sector PAFs, and a lack of
discipline over their completion and application. Objectives and indicators are often crafted
very differently. It is still unclear how much the PAFs are
being used as a management tool in order to influence decision-making: this
would seem to be essential in order to justify their complexity and time
demands. AusAID performance measures are
not fully aligned with Government of Indonesia measures.
AusAID Indonesia is still to
finalise a country-level PAF (though some good work is being done on this and a
draft is at an advanced stage), which makes assessment of overall programme performance
and quality difficult. As mentioned
earlier, the original PAF contained in the country strategy is not followed.
The Annual Programme Performance Review report is comprehensive and
shows commendable frankness. In this one
management document there is the possibility to capture the effectiveness and
efficiency of the programme. Overall,
this is an excellent exercise and the Indonesia team’s decision to produce an
interim six-month report is to be commended. However, the sector coverage is too disparate
and greater consolidation needs to occur. Once again there is a danger that a
bunch of separate sector silos will develop without adequate overall
cohesion. There appeared to be little
management follow-up to actions and recommendations identified in the Annual
Programme Performance Review until last year.
The Minister Counsellor now has her annual performance assessment based
on the management actions identified in the Review. This approach should be followed more widely.
3.6 A review of evaluations, project completion reports and mid-term
reviews tells an interesting story and highlights some valuable
lessons. AusAID Indonesia is good at ensuring evaluations and reviews occur and
the quality of some of them is high, though many suffer from a lack of evidence
to support findings and recommendations.
There is little consistency in their terms of reference, objectives and
even in clarifying what they are for and for whom. This is not unusual for AusAID and indeed
most donors. Evaluation plans for
programmes are generally weak and at a purely subjective level it appeared that
management has not generally used evaluations to inform decision-making. At least there is now a formal management
response to every evaluation, even if they can be a bit insipid and
non-committal. Some lessons from recent
evaluations and reviews include: i) many programmes and projects are over-ambitious
in claims of what can be achieved and more realism is required; ii) better data
is required on programmes in order to provide proper evidence of progress and
success or failure; iii) multilateral agencies tend to have poor monitoring
systems; iv) at the design stage insufficient time is spent on choosing the
best delivery mechanism and form of aid.
While this latter point is a common lesson derived from the evaluations,
the reality is that for the most part the choices of forms of aid appear to be
sensible and appropriate.
AusAID is working hard to
simplify and strengthen its approach to monitoring and evaluation of its
programmes through “Standards for Monitoring and Evaluation” and an
accompanying capacity building programme for AusAID and partner staff. This is a good initiative and it bodes
well. Consolidation and standardisation
of monitoring and evaluation systems is long overdue and the current situation
is disparate, overly-complex and of marginal benefit in terms of providing
useful information.
3.7 The AusAID programme in Indonesia is more aligned with Indonesian
government systems than most other parts of the bilateral aid programme and over 30% is being funded directly through the Government of Indonesia
budget system and 20% using its procurement systems. The proportion through the Indonesian budget
system will increase to well over 40% in the next 24 months or so as new
programmes in the education and poverty/decentralisation sectors come on line
and the use of government procurement systems will also rise. There
is great diversity in the forms of aid and for the most part this diversity is
well considered and appropriate.
AusAID is approaching fiduciary risk sensibly and seriously and good
systems are in place to help ensure quality and value for money. Long term advisers account for just under 5%
of the total value of the programme, which is very low. Direct investments are high. Technical assistance is a small but important
part of the programme. High level
technical assistance is greatly valued by the Indoensian Government and it is
requesting more high calibre people and advice.
There are some important
lessons that can be taken from the AusAID experience of working through
Indonesian Government systems: i) establishing successful programmes takes time
and effort and a shared understanding of the objectives from both sides; ii)
AusAID staff involved in programmes that operate through partner government
systems should have strong public financial management skills and training in
forms of aid; iii) successful programmes for the most part evolve from smaller
beginnings; iv) strong partner government leadership is required from the
ministerial and departmental head level; v) there is no ‘one size fits all’
approach and careful choices need to be made as to the manner and depth of
engagement; vi) AusAID corporate systems and budgeting are geared to support
stand-alone projects, not partner-government managed programmes where e.g.
expenditure is less predictable; vii) robust fiduciary assessment is required
up-front and AusAID should avoid imposing a parallel fiduciary monitoring
system; viii) contracting companies can play an invaluable role in supporting
programmes operating through government systems (e.g. SMEC in support of the
transport loans or Cardno in support of the education loans).
3.8 The Australian whole of government aid effort presents a very mixed
scorecard. The evaluation in 2007 highlighted
the lack of coherence of the “whole of government approach”, mixed performance
in capacity building, normally linked to the varying abilities of Australian
departments and agencies to deliver international development assistance. Not a lot has changed. There has been no
consolidation of whole of government activities in spite of clear evaluation
recommendations. Indeed the current
situation, with the exception of ACIAR (which has consolidated its activities
sensibly) is worse than in 2007. In
FY2009/10 there were 103 individual activities and projects implemented by government
departments and agencies outside the AusAID budget to a total expenditure of
$39.5m, and 38 whole of government activities funded by AusAID to a total
expenditure of $14.6m. Commitment to
effectiveness is very mixed and there is no coordination of the disparate
efforts. Officials in BAPPENAS
complained of Australia’s lack of internal government coordination and multiple
approaches and activities, which distracts and hampers Indonesian officials. All of this said, there are some clear
examples of Australian departments contributing considerably to Indonesian
development outcomes, notably in the economic governance sector where officials
from e.g. Treasury, the Tax Office and the Department of Finance are highly
valued by their Indonesian counterparts and are having a solid impact (e.g. on
increased Indonesian government tax revenue).
Australian Federal Police (AFP) support for counter-terrorism has been
very successful, though current efforts on counter-people smuggling are harder
to assess. It was beyond the scope of
this review to delve into the work of most other government departments.
Some Australian government departments lack the capacity to work
overseas to any real standard and greater rigour is needed in determining who
and what should be funded from the aid vote.
DFAT does a good job of coordinating the policy efforts in
counter-terrorism, security and people-smuggling, though it is beyond the
Department’s remit and capacity to assess the implementation in these
sectors. However, there is no proper
coordination or oversight of much of the other work outside of AusAID’s and
DFAT’s main priorities and many departments and agencies seem to resist the
idea of such oversight and coordination.
This needs to be rectified. It is
also a paradox that the department receiving little support from the aid budget
is DFAT: $250,000 per year for its small Direct Aid Programme (DAP) is woefully
inadequate. There is no reason why
greater development funding could not be provided for activities of enlightened
mutual self-interest between Australia and Indonesia. For very small sums of money the
administrative requirements should also be simplified.
It is surprising that there is not a regular high-level policy IDC
in Canberra focused on Indonesia. So
many departments have engagement in Indonesia that some sort of overarching
policy perspective would appear to be essential. DFAT and PM&C are not ensuring proper
whole of government policy coherence, which is in turn necessary for helping
ensure full aid effectiveness and coherence.
The amount of time that AusAID is expending in support of other
government departments, administering grants and giving advice is inefficient
and unnecessary. Currently 12 full time
equivalent staff positions in AusAID support the implementation of whole
of government activities (plus the involvement of the Minister Counsellor and
Operations Manager in Jakarta and Assistant Secretary in Canberra). If one removes the AusAID staff involved in
strategy, policy and design work (including important whole of government
strategy and policy work), whole of
government implementation support and oversight accounts for well over 20% of
AusAID staff time for less than 10% of the aid budget. Something is clearly wrong.
3.9 The performance of the multilateral agencies
supported by the aid programme is variable. AusAID Indonesia provides significant funding
to the development banks and UN agencies.
UN agencies are performing mostly poorly. Even UNICEF, normally a very safe pair of
hands, has not delivered to expectations in Papua in the health sector. It is not clear how much the experience of
poor UN performance in the field is influencing AusAID policy engagement with
the head offices of these agencies.
Certainly AusAID staff working on the Indonesia programme are unaware of
overall agency policy engagement with the UN.
This implies that there should be better coordination and information
exchange between the country programmes and multilateral agencies.
The level of funding to the
development banks is strikingly high.
For example, AusAID currently has just over $110m in contracted activity
through the World Bank, at close to $35m per year. Performance by the Banks is patchy and
surprisingly, with a couple of notable exceptions, AusAID staff are remarkably
tolerant of this patchy performance.
There is a lack of confidence or willingness to take on staff in the
World Bank. Bureaucratic issues in the
World Bank are getting in the way of the effective and flexible operation of,
for example, both the PNPM Support Facility and the Decentralisation Support
Facility. AusAID needs to be much more
assertive in cases such as these, should exert more influence on performance
given the high investment. That said,
this requires the senior expertise to do so which in some sectors is currently
missing in the Jakarta team. Interestingly
the Government of Indonesia expressed significant frustration over the
bureaucratic and slow performance of the World Bank trust funds and one
Minister even requested that AusAID take over the management of the PNPM
Support Facility and multi-donor trust fund.
It is worth AusAID exploring putting out the management of a major
multi-donor trust fund to tender: it can be done by a good contractor and this
would put the Banks on their toes.
Competition is good and the Banks (especially the World Bank) are far
too blasé over being the only ones who should manage such funds.
This is particularly important given that any further scaling up of
the programme will require a significantly increased investment through the
development banks. It is inconceivable
that AusAID will be able to see a primarily bilateral scaling up of its
operations to between $700m-$1bn per annum by 2015. Greater use will need to be made of the
development banks in an equal partnership.
AusAID is seen by the banks as primarily a funding source and only
secondly as providing expertise and policy capability. This should change.
3.10 The Country
Strategy speaks of a geographic
focus in Eastern Indonesia. The facts belie this, given that most of the
programme is national and only some $60m is specifically focused on the
east. Basically Australian aid to
Indonesia is national in geographic scope, with some provinces given a level of
additional attention. In spite of
significant historical Indonesian Government and donor focus on Eastern
Indonesia, development indicators are generally deteriorating in the east of
the country. This questions the overall
development strategy being applied. Attempting
to work in a similar manner in Papua to Java is clearly not sensible and it
would probably be helpful if a different lens was used when addressing the
development challenges of many of the eastern provinces. Recent work on remittances by the World Bank
and AusAID is promising given the large migrant populations from some provinces
to Malaysia and the Middle East (an estimated $6bn per annum is remitted to NTB
alone). Improving the developmental
focus of these remittances in place of their use on consumer goods, for
example, could have a significant impact on development indicators.
AusAID needs to rethink
its claimed development approach to the East (and is already beginning to do
so) and whether any specific focus is indeed desirable. At the very least a
better communications effort on geographic focus is required. The current
balance of the programme seems right and no greater regional focus should be
pursued. However, the programme should
not be marketed as having an Eastern focus.
It is essentially national with some focus on lagging provinces (e.g.
Aceh in the west). Indonesian government
perceptions of Australia’s claimed focus on the East are illuminating. Most comments were that Australia focused on
the east because the area is Christian or that it is closer to Australia. No-one
expressed a view that Australia might choose to provide support to less
developed provinces, whatever their location.
3.11 The timeliness, efficiency and costs of AusAID
programme (and project) design processes leave a great deal to be
desired. It
is very hard to pin down exactly one cause of the problem, they seem to be
numerous and the situation is chronic.
Many design efforts take an inordinate amount of time, cost a great deal
of money and often result in designs of a poor quality that have to be
“redesigned” or “retro-fitted”. The
current health sector design has already taken over four years at a cost of
close to $2m and is still incomplete (see comments on the health sector later
in this report). A 10-page concept paper
in the rural development sector has currently over 60 pages of contradictory
comments, provided over a six-month period.
Not surprisingly the design process has stalled. Design work for a long-term elections
programme started in 2007 and while some interim, stop-gap activities have
continued, the full programme has still not commenced. There are many other examples.
A lack of senior management engagement in the early concept stages
is one of the causes of AusAID’s poor performance in design. Traditionally Minister Counsellor, Assistant
Secretary, First Assistant Secretary or Director General engagement in design
processes tends to happen often at the approval stage, or at least the peer
review stage. This is far too late. Currently the Minister Counsellor is getting
involved at the early concept stage to shape direction, which is a very good
development. Design processes are often
managed by junior staff who do not have the necessary skills or
experience. When a design is well led
within AusAID, the design tends to be good.
However, much of the design work is contracted out to consultants of
mixed capability. There is too much
bureaucracy in the design process and too many people in Canberra become
involved to little or no productive effect.
The process of the designs for PNPM and the knowledge sector is more
promising and some valuable lessons can be taken from them, not least
conducting the design in-house. There
may need to be a formal role for the Canberra Indonesia desk in monitoring
design processes.
The problems associated with design need to be solved quickly since
if the Indonesia programme is to scale up in line with overall Australian
government commitments to increase aid expenditure over the next four years,
the design burden on the AusAID team in Jakarta will be great. It is not unreasonable to expect that over
the next 18 months the team will need to design a portfolio of investments of
close to $2bn (even assuming that significantly more funding goes through the
multilateral banks). The design task is
immense.
3.12 The infrastructure sector is well
managed, achieving some significant policy and practical results and is greatly
appreciated by the Government of Indonesia. Indeed, AusAID is seen as providing some good
sector leadership in road transport, water and sanitation. The infrastructure sector is one of the more
effective and better performing in the whole AusAID programme.
While the disbursements under the Eastern Indonesia National Roads Improvement
Programme (EINRIP) loan programme are slow by AusAID grant standards, compared
to the World Bank loans for roads AusAID is delivering in a more timely fashion
and with much greater focus on quality issues.
Overall AusAID has administered
loans in the education and transport sector relatively effectively and
efficiently. Disbursement criticism
of EINRIP is unwarranted and the criticism is more a reflection of an
expenditure imperative in AusAID rather than a focus on effectiveness. This is a somewhat controversial view and
warrants some further explanation.
EINRIP was designed to channel $300m in concessional loans through the
Government of Indonesia for the improvement of 400km of national roads and 1,300
metres of bridges. The programme is using
World Bank procurement systems through the Ministry of Public Works. Only $92m has been drawn down to date and it
is expected that by the time of the loan closure (March 2013) only around
$200m-$250m will have been spent. Some
funds will not be released due to defective work. This sounds more like a poor performing
loan. However, AusAID is the only donor
really holding the Ministry of Public Works to quality indicators and the
quality and safety of the EINRIP roads are demonstrably better than other
national road improvements with the same price/km. The World Bank sister project to EINRIP is
running three years behind in spite of starting at the same time. AusAID is now having some significant impact
at a national policy level, including forcing attention to be paid finally to
corruption and poor performance by contractors.
AusAID has a real opportunity to help facilitate some significant
improvements on the management of the roads sector in Indonesia and to pull
back now from national roads would be irresponsible and a waste of the time,
effort and money expended to date. Loan
funding provides a much more credible presence and given the economic benefit
of national roads it makes no sense to finance them through grants. The 2013 loan closure date should be observed
in order to make clear Australia’s seriousness.
The spending imperative should be withdrawn and loan funding should be
managed and monitored differently to grant funding. Chronic underbidding by contractors and the
ensuing delays and scope variations could be addressed by establishing fixed
price contracts.
Other parts of the transport sector are performing very well. The work of the Indonesia Infrastructure
Initiative is impressive and the close cooperation between AusAID, the Indonesian
Government and the contractor is to be commended. It is a good example of how the three parties
can work closely and effectively across a whole sector programme. The cash on delivery ‘HIBAH” system of
water-supply connectivity is proving a significant success with 33,000
households already connected since May 2010.
The overall HIBAH process (run by the Ministry of Finance, developed
with AusAID support) holds out great potential for a nationwide roll-out. The work in solid waste, wastewater master
plans and policy work in the rail sector is also effective and has promise to
see major implementation success. AusAID
is supporting BAPPENAS in the preparation of two public private partnership
proposals for the market (water supply in eastern Java and Jakarta water
supply). The work in radio frequency
spectrum reform builds on earlier AusAID success in the secure auction of 3G
bandwidth, with the potential of $2.5bn in government revenues and excellent
country-wide spectrum coverage.
In spite of overall very positive counterpart assessment, AusAID has
been criticised by the Indonesian Government in the sector for not
communicating sufficiently at the inception stages and design of
sub-programmes, for variable bureaucratic rules and procedures between
activities (a chronic AusAID problem) and also for being at times cumbersome
and insufficiently accommodating to requests for assistance. The Indonesian Government wants more high
calibre international technical assistance in the sector.
3.13 The Education sector has been much in the public eye and political debate in recent
months. It is not the job of this report
to comment on the debate, but to provide a balanced view of Australia’s support
to the education sector over the past five years and also of the proposed new
Education Partnership with Indonesia.
However, given the context, this section will be a little more detailed
than for other sectors. The importance
of education to Indonesia’s development is self-evident: education contributes
to economic growth, better health, reduced fertility, lower maternal and child
mortality and stronger democratic and government institutions. Australia’s choice to provide significant
funding to education ($437m since 2006) was sensible and for the most part AusAID’s
work in the sector has achieved some very positive and concrete results, not
least the construction of 2,075 junior secondary schools which has led to local
school access for over 330,000 students in the poorer and more remote parts of
the archipelago. The construction of
these schools would not have occurred in a timely manner without Australian
support, or to an adequate standard.
Unquestionably Australian support has helped the Government of Indonesia
make significant strides in its goal of achieving universal access under its
Education for All programme. Moreover,
positive and less visible advances have also been made in the areas of support
for the Islamic schooling sector, improving learning materials and also simple
improvements in the education system.
The Basic Education Program provided $200m in loans to the
Government of Indonesia and accordingly made full use of local financial
systems. The loan programme worked well
and all funds were disbursed in a timely manner. The combination of grants ($187m) and loans
($200m) was effective and allowed for a successful scaling up of Australian
support. Greater progress could perhaps
have been made in the area of education quality and improved learning outcomes
if the construction component hadn’t been so dominant: though the school
construction programme was undoubtedly the aspect of the project of greatest
interest to the Government of Indonesia.
The Learning Assistance Program for Islamic Schools (2004-2010) has
made some significant strides in improving the standards of teacher training as
well as equality of learning outcomes for girls and boys. Australia has only supported Islamic schools
that teach the national curriculum and its vetting procedures to ensure the
schools it supports are committed to pluralism are very robust.
Australia’s assistance is greatly valued and it has provided strong
leadership in the sector, in spite of weak technical capacity within the AusAID
team. The Education Sector Working Group
is co-chaired by the Vice Minister for Education and AusAID Minister Counsellor
and is becoming a very strong and effective mechanism for donor collaboration
with the Government of Indonesia.
The new education sector programme design has not been without
difficulties (in terms of timeliness and quality of consultation), however the
Education Partnership is for the most part well considered and builds strongly
on the lessons learned from pervious Australian support to the sector. The Partnership incorporates support and
significant co-financing from the ADB and EU and will focus on improving
access, quality and management of education services. The partnership benefits from simplicity of
activities and significant scale ($500m over five years), as well as from
employing full use of Indonesian Government procurement and financial
systems. A brief comment on the four
components of the partnership is helpful.
Firstly, Australia will support the construction of 2,000 new or
rehabilitated lower secondary schools through government systems. This makes sense provided adequate monitoring
and safeguards are in place and also provided proper analysis is done on
whether in some areas new construction is warranted or whether rehabilitation
and improved maintenance offer a better return.
The design is suitably flexible to allow for these choices. Secondly, the Partnership will support
improved school management by training all 293,000 of Indonesia’s school
principals, supervisors and district education officials. This is ambitious but does address a crucial
impediment to improved learning outcomes, namely poor school management and
local resource allocations. Thirdly,
the Partnership will aim to improve the quality of Islamic education by helping
at least 1,500 private Islamic schools achieve national accreditation, thereby
securing the authority to administer national examinations and issue school
leaving certificates. Given that a large
proportion of Islamic schools are in the poorer parts of the country, education
quality tends to be very low.
Accreditation lifts quality and also will reduce dependency on external
funding, such as that coming from the Middle East. It could be argued that the Partnership could
devote more attention to supporting this part of the sector, subject to the
capacity of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to absorb more funding and
assistance. Finally, the
Partnership will contribute to better evidence-based policy and decision-making
through access to expertise in evaluation, monitoring and analysis. Indonesia is not alone in seeking this sort
of support since date collection is very poor globally in the education
sector.
Finally, a brief mention of scholarships, which account for $42m per
annum in expenditure for over 300 new post-graduate places annually. The Government of Indonesia sees this as one
of the most valuable areas of Australian support and a further expansion to 500
new places a year by 2013 is warranted.
In conclusion, Australian
support to the education sector has been well considered and managed and has
achieved tangible positive outcomes at a reasonable cost-effectiveness. AusAID’s plans for further support to the
sector are sensible and have the prospect of building considerably on successes
to date. The decision to scale up further
in the education sector is correct.
Early thinking on expansion to the tertiary sector is interesting, but
beyond the scope of this report to comment further.
3.14 The Health sector is performing
well in the HIV & Aids arena, but more poorly on the broader health systems
side. There
is a lack of coherence to the sector and this is reflected in the PAF where
there is no single over-arching objective for AusAID’s support. There are merely sub-sector objectives, which
create silos of activity and also means that the health sector is really only
managed at the initiative level, not at a broader health system level. This is in marked difference to e.g.
education and infrastructure.
Furthermore, the sector PAF is not aligned with the objectives monitored
in the Annual Programme Performance Review.
This creates a great deal of confusion over any sort of
accountability.
60% of all HIV expenditure in Indonesia comes from donors, while
only 6% of funding for the health system.
AusAID may be perpetrating inappropriate vertical programming. The AusAID-funded HIV project is performing
well and has secured some good impact in prevention, care and treatment
programmes as well as promoting strengthened leadership of the national and
sub-national response to HIV & AIDS.
There is no formal donor coordination in HIV except in the Global Fund
Forum which appears to be of marginal benefit.
The Global Fund is spending $300m in Indonesia and Australia is a large
donor to the Fund: it is unclear what the role is of the AusAID post in
influencing and monitoring Global Fund activities in the country. This is another case where there is very poor
alignment between the sector groups in Canberra and the country office.
The lengthy, inefficient health sector support programme design is
unacceptable. The design has cost close
to $2m over more than four years and is yet to be peer reviewed. It is heavily focused on capacity building at
a central level and seems to be short on ideas for seeing clear improvements in
service delivery on the ground.
Increased funding through the PNPM Generasi
programme would arguably be a more effective way of seeing improved service
delivery. Given that the Indonesian
Ministry of Health has not been particularly cooperative with donors it really
does beg the question whether a major investment, in a fairly traditional
health systems capacity building programme, is worth the money.
Performance of UN agencies in the health sector has been
particularly bad. Funding has been
withdrawn for UNICEF’s health activity in Papua and for FAO in the area of
animal health. AusAID also has concerns
over the performance of WHO in Indonesia.
3.15 Performance of the democratic
governance sector is mixed, not least due to a lack of clarity over what
exactly is meant by the term “democratic governance”. This is reflected in
commendably frank internal AusAID assessments and working documents. Essentially the sector in AusAID is
comprised of i) elections; ii) law and justice activity; and iii) support to
whole of government activities in counter-terrorism, democracy and
pluralism. Activities at an individual
level have for the most part performed well, though policy engagement in the
law and justice sector has been weak.
The primary problem is a lack of coherence for the different activities
and a definition of what it is that AusAID overall is trying to achieve. There is only a PAF for the law and justice
work. Once again there is evidence of a
lack of coherence in thinking over sector performance.
Design processes have been very poor, lengthy and expensive. The new Australia Indonesia Partnership for
Justice was three years in the making but finally has some direction. As is the case with many AusAID programmes
the peer review and wider consultation process tends to see too many additional
things added to a solid core design that distracts from overall focus and
impact. The elections project has been
four years in the making and again is probably a little too complex for
sensible implementation. The idea of a
competitive grant mechanism is a very good one.
The sector is a success story in reducing the number of initiatives
and individual contracts, which had been swamping the team in terms of basic
oversight and administration. The two
new large programmes will simplify things considerably. The whole of government activities are still
very time consuming and further consolidation and simplification is
required.
AusAID needs to assess
both its views on the funding of democracy and also how it seeks to make use of
civil society in the programme. A number of interlocutors commented that
AusAID appears to have an ambivalent view of democracy and the use of aid
funding in support of it. Democracy is a
major focus for the Indonesian government and it would appear that some parts
of both governments would welcome greater Australian support for activities in
support of democracy. This is linked to
a lack of a clear strategy for AusAID on its engagement with civil
society. It is unclear whether AusAID
sees civil society as an important actor in generating demand for better
governance, as an advocate and monitor, or as a provider of service
delivery. Civil society can be all of
these, but AusAID does not yet have any clarity on its position in any of these
areas and civil society is mostly supported in a somewhat ad-hoc manner in
individual sectors.
The Australian Government has been requested by the President’s
office and BAPPENAS to help on bureaucratic reform in the Indonesian public
service. There are mixed views as to
whether the aid programme can or should become involved in such a major (and
much needed) activity. Certainly AusAID
should be prepared to drop another sector if it does launch into bureaucratic
reform.
3.16 The climate change sector is
having mixed results with the development of a carbon accounting system and
support to the Government of Indonesia Green Paper process being stand-out
successes. Questions remain over the
efficacy and value for money of a second REDD demonstration. A bit of background is
probably warranted here. Climate change
represents an opportunity for Indonesia and Australia to work together to
influence global climate change agreements and that diplomatic imperative should
not be understated. Indonesia was the
first developing country to announce mitigation efforts in the lead up to COP
15 and has requested international support.
Norway, World Bank and Japan are all larger donors to climate change
activities in Indonesia, though Australia has been a leading partner in
international negotiations. Indonesia is
also a large carbon emitter due to high rates of deforestation and peatland
degradation. In high fire years
Indonesia can rank third on the list of largest global emitters.
AusAID and the Department of Climate Change have a range of
activities in Indonesia, with mitigation work being focused on the Forest
Carbon Partnership and Reductions in Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD). As mentioned, the
support that Australia has provided in the development of a carbon accounting
system has been excellent, as is the effort around the development of the
Indonesian Government’s Green Paper on low carbon growth. This area seems worthy of much more attention
and low carbon growth should be included in the sector PAF. Australia could be doing more in providing
much-needed technical assistance through some sort of linkages programme
between Indonesian and Australian government agencies.
For the REDD activities, delays have emerged with the Department of
Forestry. The current Kalamantan REDD
demonstration is a large investment ($40m) and has had some successes in
testing science and methodologies in this relatively new area of climate change
mitigation. Australia’s
well-advanced REDD demonstration on degraded peatlands in the Province should help to shape the provincial response to its high emissions, and Australia can now offer diverse lessons and a level of practical experience on many core elements of
REDD, including issues such as community engagement and consultation, technical
methods to restore and rehabilitate degraded peat, and MRV systems (measurable,
reportable and verifiable carbon emissions). That may
provide an opportunity to
achieve greater scale and impact, if the current pilot work
can be taken up at a provincial scale.
Whether this indeed occurs will need to be revisited in a couple of
years when the real impact of the demonstration can be better assessed. However, the importance and
impact of the REDD demonstration should not be overstated. It is, after all, a highly sanitised
environment covering a tiny area compared to the rest of the country. The cause of deforestation and forest/peatland
degradation is the behaviour of man.
Protecting an area from human interaction is not really the answer. To this end, it is strongly questioned
whether the expansion of the programme to a second demonstration site is
warranted and good value for money.
International experience over the past 30 years on successful,
sustainable forest protection and reforestation in protected areas is very
poor. Early re-establishment is easy:
long term protection from the very forces that caused the destruction in the
first place is a different matter.
Accordingly, since the REDD science is now much advanced the focus
should be on seeing how incentives through a Carbon Fund can benefit local
communities and so change the economic forces that drive deforestation and
forest degradation. It is far from clear
than a new demonstration site would provide any further benefit. This review supports the draft conclusion of
the ongoing mid-term evaluation of the Forest Carbon partnership that it might
be better to work through decentralised governments (province and
district) to support low carbon growth strategies at the local level - and to
support national policy development where this option is available.
The development of the latest adaptation activities seems to have
been driven by the need for political announcements and a Canberra agenda rather
than burning requirements in Indonesia.
It is recommended that Australia decide whether it wishes to enter the
adaptation field in Indonesia and if so do so seriously, on a demand-driven
basis from the Indonesian government.
3.17 The economic governance sector is
performing well, even though it is only a small part of the overall programme. Australian assistance has
achieved some impressive results and has enjoyed considerable policy
influence. The Indonesian Government is
particularly praising of some of the technical assistance in this area. The core of the economic governance programme
is contained in the whole of government Government Partnership Fund and the
Technical Assistance Management Facility (now AIPEG), both established to
provide support to the Indonesian Government in improved economic management
following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/98. The work with the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank in this sector has been particularly
fruitful and the Banks have performed well.
An AusAID public financial management specialist works two days per week
out of the World Bank office, an interesting development and one that could be
replicated in more sectors. The sector
is coherent and the PAF is clear and focused.
To date over 6,000 Australian and Indonesian officials have
exchanged expertise under the Government Partnership fund through 15
partnership agreements between respective economic management agencies. The work of Treasury and the Australian Tax
Office has been particularly impressive and the Department of Finance has also
helped achieve some good progress in assisting the Indonesian Government begin
to implement a Medium Term Expenditure Framework and also performance based
budgeting. In a period of only a year
the number of tax payers in Indonesia increased by 36% to 14.6m with support
from Australia. The percentage of tax
revenue to GDP has been steadily increasing over the period of tax assistance. The percentage of Indonesian external debt
stocks to gross national income fell from 54% to 34% in three years to
2009. The Indonesian government credits
Australian assistance for significantly assisting it in its reform efforts and
for helping it survive the global economic crisis in 2008/09 relatively
unscathed. Responding to a request from
the Indonesian Government, an Australian-supported individual was provided to
the Fiscal Policy Office to help Indonesia fulfil its G20 commitments and to
provide advice directly to the Finance Minister on G20 issues.
Arguably some of the AusAID-supported activities in economic
governance are the most influential and effective of the whole aid
programme. The danger going forward is
that the work becomes a victim of its own success and the lack of any perceived
crisis will lead to complacency and a lack of interest from Australian
agencies. This must not be allowed to
happen. In the Asian financial crisis of
1997/98 an additional 27 million Indonesians dropped below the poverty
line. In the global economic crisis of
2008/09 the Indonesian economy continued to grow at 4%. The positive impact on poverty levels of
Australian support to the sector is significant, obviously possible due to a
reformist Indonesian government and high quality Indonesian capability. More work needs to be done in encouraging and
facilitating greater cohesion between Indonesian economic management agencies
and institutions.
Greater attention should be
given to incorporating public financial management approaches across other
parts of the AusAID programme. Also
greater public financial management assistance and attention is needed at the
sub-national level and in the sharp end of service delivery.
3.18 The recent work in poverty reduction
and social protection has been excellent and some of the decentralisation
support work is also very good. Targeted support and policy input to the
Government of Indonesia’s vast PNPM programme has been of a very high quality
and the support provided on social protection issues through the Vice President’s
office is verging on best practice.
Co-location of some activities in the field has been a positive move. However, there needs to be more coherence
between the different aspects of the decentralisation, social protection, rural
development and poverty reduction programmes.
Currently there are three separate PAFs in the whole sector (though it
is good to see many Indonesian government performance indicators being
incorporated), which is essentially about ensuring services actually reach the
rural poor throughout Indonesia. The
importance of these programmes cannot be overstated. While the number of people in poverty in
Indonesia has been declining steadily, around 15.4% of the population is still
below the national poverty line of US$1.55/day and half the population lives
below US$2.00/day. Poverty is skewed
strongly to the rural areas in all aspects of the MDGs. Australia’s focus on programmes to support
the rural poor is sensible and necessary.
The flagship of Australia’s approach is the recent commitment of
$215m in support of PNPM from 2010 to 2015.
PNPM is a government of Indonesia community-development project that
currently reaches 80,000 villages across the country through direct cash
transfers for pre-approved growth-oriented activities, benefitting at least 35m
people, the largest community social protection programme in the world. PNPM also enables emergency cash transfers in
times of severe economic stress.
Australia’s support is focused on technical assistance to support PNPM
management, improving monitoring and evaluation, strengthening capacity of
sub-national governments, scaling up PNPM Generasi,
(a highly promising pilot programme that targets health and education service
delivery), and support for a women’s microcredit programme to improve access to
finance. Indonesian Government, donors
and external observers all comment on the importance and effectiveness of
Australia’s contribution. This is supported
by first hand field evidence. PNPM
offers a strong, host-country owned, mechanism for large scale-up of the aid
programme that delivers directly to the rural poor, on a national scale. AusAID’s policy input is of a very high
standard and it is well supported by the strong decentralisation work being
undertaken in Eastern Indonesia under the Australia Indonesia Partnership for
Decentralisation (which supports supply, demand and knowledge-sharing for
better sub-national governance and service delivery). The early PNPM Generasi outcomes in the health sector indicate that this could be
a better mechanism for delivering on health service delivery and influencing
health system management than proceeding down an overly-complex health-sector
support project.
Greater use could be made of PNPM delivery mechanisms. Stand-alone projects such as LOGICA in Aceh
and ACESS in Eastern Indonesia are of questionable value for money and while
doing some localised good work need to be revisited immediately with a view to
bringing to scale. As a simple step the
ACESS training could be incorporated into PNPM facilitator training. This is a
clear example of how activities have been allowed to operate in silos without
looking at ways to bring greater coherence to the programme as a whole. Similarly the current design work in rural
development seems more to be a function of Canberra-driven requirements for
discrete budget measure activity rather than the most logical way forward which
would be to create a rural development window under PNPM to trial in a couple
of provinces and then, if successful, take to scale nationally.
Currently there is also a lack of coherence between this part of the
AusAID programme and the other sectors.
This is beginning to change, but much more needs to be done. This also highlights the poor knowledge
management systems and practice within AusAID.
It is surprising that AusAID still does not have a proper electronic
document and records management system.
The planned approaches to knowledge management by the Indonesia team are
promising and should be supported strongly corporately.
3.19 AusAID has generally responded well to
disasters and
the legacy of its effective support in Aceh remains very positive in the
bilateral relationship. The
Australia/Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction seems popular with both
governments and after a slow start is applying technology to disaster risk
reduction well. Some questions remain
over its longer term sustainability without ongoing Australian financial
support, though Indonesian government funding for disaster reduction and response
has increased by 20-fold in two years. The
division of responsibilities between the Facility and the disaster response
team in the Embassy seems to be clearer than even a year ago and there appears
to be good collaboration, though the fragmented funding base adds unnecessary
complexity. There is a single PAF for
disaster preparedness and response, though it is very Australia-oriented and
does not incorporate Indonesian Government objectives and indicators. According to Indonesian counterparts, Australia
is a global leader in risk and hazard analysis and they would like to take full
advantage of that expertise.
A very quick assessment of Australia’s support to the response to
the Mentawai Islands tsunami (October 2010) and Mt Merapi volcanic eruptions
(October/November 2010) is positive.
Australia’s offer of assistance was accepted before the Indonesian
Government officially requested international aid. AusAID assistance was sensibly in the form of
funding to non-government organisations, showing confidence in Indonesia’s
capacity for disaster response and not undermining that by the deployment of
large numbers of international civilian and particularly military
personnel. AusAID should invest more in
disaster response training and planning for NGOs, multilaterals and faith-based
organisations.
4.
Corporate Issues and
Obstacles to Further Scaling-up of the Programme
The management team of the AusAID Indonesia programme conducted a mid-term
review of its operations in 2010. It
concluded that while the programme itself was going well, corporate lacunae and impediments and poor management were hindering
greater effectiveness of the programme and would make further scale-up
extremely difficult. This was a correct
conclusion. The mid-term review was
conducted by James Gilling (Canberra) and Scott Guggenheim (Jakarta) and raised
a number of weaknesses that needed further attention, some being management
issues. The Minister Counsellor acted
immediately and commissioned assistance in building a more cohesive management
team and to help her lift the overall quality of the management skills and
accountability of senior staff in Jakarta.
This work is well in hand.
4.2 AusAID Indonesia
is a $450m/year business, employing 155 staff directly in Indonesia and over
350 indirectly. It is highly complex and
politically charged. The sheer operational delivery demands of
such a programme are immense, requiring highly developed management and aid
delivery skills and experience. At
the same time, AusAID Indonesia is a public sector entity with APS, Ministerial
and Parliamentary demands and strictures.
There is a danger that this can be seen as contradictory and the
fundamental challenge for management is how to marry the two into a coherent
whole. Currently management is falling
into the gap between the two, neither fish nor fowl. It is incorrect to believe that running such
a large programme can be done simply with excellent public service skills. What
is required of management is excellent operational aid delivery experience and
excellent public service skills. Anything
less will be problematic as the programme scales up further. This is not a problem driven by AusAID in
Jakarta, it is a wider AusAID issue and can only be remedied in Canberra.
4.3 Over the past four years the Canberra budget process has
effectively driven the evolution of the programme, not the Country Strategy. Currently AusAID is
managing 17 different budget measures within the Indonesia programme, many of
which have been developed independently of the country team and are not aligned
with the Country Strategy. This is
inefficient, hinders development effectiveness and establishes perverse
incentives. RECOMMENDATION: Funding should be provided to AusAID for its broad
programmes, not sectoral budget measures. Information provided by AusAID indicates that
central agencies in Canberra are cautiously positive about such a change:
anything less will have a significant impact on aid programme
effectiveness. Essentially AusAID is
being held accountable for delivering on effectiveness while Commonwealth
budget strictures undermine the agency’s ability to meet that
accountability. This seems innately
illogical and contrary to sound public financial management.
4.4 There is a
fundamental disconnect between the increasing use of Indonesian Government
systems and the annual imperative for AusAID programmes to spend all of their
budget allocation by 30th June each year. This year-end spending imperative is leading
to inefficient and ineffective use of funds in the final couple of months of
the financial year. The Indonesian
Government follows the calendar year as its financial year, AusAID the
Australian financial year. Funds going
through Indonesian systems constitute less than 1% of Indonesian government
expenditure. To expect the Indonesian
Government to go through extra hoops to meet Australian spending requirements
is illogical and contrary to aid effectiveness.
The result is that there are apparent under-spends in some programmes and
in others expenditure is cranked up in the final months of the year for
questionable development gains or funds are simply parked in trust funds or
transfeered to multilateral agencies.
The Department of Finance has offered a carry-over facility to AusAID
which has been refused, apparently through a concern that SES staff will not
ensure funds are spent. That seems to
miss the point. SES staff should be held
accountable for expenditure through carry-over strictures and if they do not
come up to the mark they can be sanctioned, e.g. through a freeze on promotion
opportunities for 24 months. RECOMMENDATION:
A six-month carry-over facility is necessary for the Indonesia programme and
AusAID as a whole, especially when dealing with the relative unpredictability
of timing of expenditure through partner government systems and budgets. Loan funding should be treated differently to
grant funding and should only have a “life of loan” stricture, not financial
year spending requirements.
4.5 Part of the terms
of reference for this review asked for an assessment of the devolution of
programme management to the field over the past five years. Indonesia is arguably the most devolved of
AusAID’s programmes. By most measures devolution of the
Indonesia programme has been successful: the quality of the programme has
increased, has much greater policy influence, is significantly more relevant to
the Indonesian government and is being administered efficiently and
effectively. The question is whether
this would have occurred anyway under a Canberra-managed programme. The answer is probably not. It has not been without problems and the
devolved model is not cheap, with a much larger number of staff required
in-country. These costs can be offset by
greater use of local staff and improved corporate systems and processes. The traditionally most effective of the
donors and development actors operate with very strong country operations, such
as DfID, the World Bank, the Dutch Government.
RECOMMENDATION: It would be a
mistake to re-centralise programme management.
The key to further scaling up will be to increase the experience and
capability of SES management and mid-level management in AusAID. This capability should include aid management,
public service, technical and people management skills.
4.6 AusAID
human resources systems are acting as an impediment to the efficient management
and effectiveness of the programme. There are numerous examples of perverse
incentives in the HR systems of AusAID.
According to current policy, a good posted officer will have to wait 5
years before being eligible for promotion, compared to two years if not
posted. There are no incentives for
specialisation in AusAID. Bulk
recruitment is not serving the Indonesia programme. Posting decisions do not meet the Jakarta
post’s needs. Managers are not in
control of their staffing resources. RECOMMENDATION: A major overhaul of
AusAID’s HR systems is necessary as a matter of urgency. AusAID executive management seems well aware
of the necessity of addressing the human resource constraints and is in the
process of strengthening attention in this area.
4.7 A significant number of AusAID A-based staff in Jakarta do
not have the requisite skills and experience needed to perform their jobs properly. This is no fault of the
staff members themselves. Language
skills are inadequate amongst the A-based and until recently there was no
language requirement prior to a posting.
It is impossible to have proper interaction with Indonesian Government officials
without good Bahasa. Language training
is now offered to a maximum of 12 weeks: this is still inadequate. Some staff at the Counsellor and First
Secretary level are posted without prior overseas aid delivery experience. Given the size and complexity of the
Indonesia programme this is reckless. In
some cases it works out well, in some cases it doesn’t. In all cases where staff are posted without
prior overseas aid management experience their effectiveness in at least the
early part of a posting is significantly diminished. It is inconceivable that the Defence Force
would post an individual to Jakarta in a senior role without prior overseas
military experience or that DfAT would post a Counsellor to Jakarta without a
prior posting. Furthermore, proper training
needs to be provided in public financial management, forms of aid and
negotiation and diplomacy prior to posting (DfID and the Dutch do this very
well, often requiring staff to pass exams prior to posting). Without it staff simply do not have the
skills and credibility to work effectively with senior counterparts and also
colleagues in the development banks. The
burden this also places on the Minister Counsellor and Operations Manager is
immense. RECOMMENDATIONS:
At a minimum all posted staff should receive six months of language training
and should also receive proper training in public financial management and
forms of aid. All Counsellors should
have prior aid delivery experience overseas.
AusAID should establish a programme to ensure staff moving up through
the system have adequate overseas experience, including introducing compulsory
overseas secondments within the graduate programme.
4.8 Many staff within
AusAID and outside have expressed concern over one aspect of the new remuneration
framework for consultants (though such a framework is long overdue and an
excellent initiative). There is a danger that if the consultancy
rates are set too low, AusAID will lose some extremely important and effective
individuals. The Government of
Indonesia expects world class technical assistance and AusAID needs to be able
to respond to this request. Consultancy
rates for senior, highly experienced individuals are not out of perspective
when compared with the cost of whole of government staff paid for by AusAID and
an AusAID posted officer. The Director
General’s flexibility for approval of rates above the stipulated maximum will
be required for the Indonesia Programme.
4.9 The scope and complexity of the job of the head of AusAID
in Indonesia is significantly greater than normally expected of an Assistant
Secretary.
The Operations Manager is only a Counsellor role acting up to an
Assistant Secretary and the replacement is advertised at a Counsellor level
with extra duties. RECOMMENDATION: The position of head of AusAID in Jakarta should be
at the First Assistant Secretary level, supported by 2 Assistant Secretary
positions, one for policy and strategy and one for operations. The Assistant Secretary in Canberra should
report to the Jakarta-based First Assistant Secretary, who in turn would report
to the Deputy Secretary. The
current Minister Counsellor is performing the role admirably and should simply
be promoted at post.
4.10 There is far too much paperwork, reports
and processes in AusAID. On a very
subjective assessment of the Indonesia programme, something between 50-70% of
reports, documents, processes and briefs do not lead to any decisions or
actions.
Reporting and compliance are taking the place of proper risk management
and the use of relevant management information.
This is strangling the agency at all levels. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
increased time spent on reporting, briefing and compliance with increasing
numbers of processes is one of the factors contributing to the poor
disbursement rate of the Indonesia programme.
Staff are simply not spending their time on the activities that really
matter to the effective implementation and delivery of the aid programme. This implies that, when fixed, there is
significant “spare” capacity in the agency that can be applied elsewhere. RECOMMENDATIONS:
AusAID needs to undertake a fundamental review of its reporting and business
processes to create much greater simplicity and efficiency. Until this is done it would be premature to
determine future staffing levels since greater efficiency and simplification
would free up capacity of existing staff.
4.11 Senior managers are not always focusing
on the right things. The current approach to delegations provides
incentives for senior managers (SES and to some extent Counsellors) to engage
in the development of strategies and programmes only at the final approval
stages. This is too late. SES officers must engage in e.g. designs at
the early concept stage and should be the ones driving major strategies.
4.12 Management needs to overhaul its approach
to risk management and introduce proper accountability for risk mitigation. Risk cannot be managed by reporting and
paperwork and simple compliance. While
risks seem to be well handled overall, this tends to be done on an ad-hoc basis
and depends heavily on the experience of a few of the senior managers at post
and on the desk, and is informal, not through the myriad of unnecessary
processes or inadequate formal corporate risk format. The lack of a proper risk register is in and
of itself a risk. The annual report
prepared for Canberra doesn’t catch most of the real risks to the programme and
is useless as a proper management tool for ongoing risk management. It is inconceivable that any private sector
organization of the size and complexity of the AusAID programme in Indonesia
would function without a full and detailed register and proper quarterly
executive management review. The
Indonesia programme needs to establish a proper, operational risk management
register and nominate someone as Risk Administrator. A template of a possible register could cover
financial risks, operational risks, political risks, reputational risks,
insurance and contractual risks, human resources and security risks, business
process risks, IT risks, property risks, environmental risks and health and
safety risks. For any risk on the
register there is an individual responsible for its mitigation and response. The Management team should convene quarterly
as a Risk Committee and have a proper discussion of risk and risk mitigation
across the programme. The Deputy
Secretary should attend these meetings from Canberra via video conference. RECOMMENDATION: The Indonesia programme needs to establish a proper, operational
risk management register and nominate someone as Risk Administrator (the
Operations Manager would be the obvious choice).
4.13 The Indonesia programme and AusAID more
broadly is poor at saying no to new initiatives. Some good progress has been made in reducing
the number of initiatives, activities and agreements over the past 12 months,
but there appear to be few, if any, incentives in AusAID for programme
consolidation. The budget process
doesn’t help. AusAID senior management in
Canberra needs to address this issue otherwise further scaling up of the
programme will become more resource-intensive and inefficient.
4.14 The AusAID Indonesia team is
under-performing when it comes to timeliness of programme expenditure. It also needs to improve
its performance on people and team management, risk management and
establishment of proper management accountability. It is well aware of this and good progress is
already being made.
4.15 The Effectiveness
Review team asked that brief comment be made over the efficacy and interaction
between the Indonesia programme and the Canberra-based technical thematic
groups. Very little time was spent on
this, so observations are very subjective and based on some anecdotal
observation and commentary. However, it
is clear that the thematic groups are not having much of a positive impact on
design processes. Ensuring quality of
design is an important element of the thematic group’s role: in this regard it
is failing in Indonesia. Whether it has
any authority to undertake its mandate is another question. It also appears that the peer review process
is leading to scope creep on programmes and a simple activity focused on e.g.
public financial management may end up after thematic group peer review
over-complicated with gender, climate change, HIV, child protection etc... There is an obvious decision-making
disconnect within AusAID, and the roles of different individuals and sections
needs to be clarified. There is no
question that AusAID needs very high calibre technical capability (and
especially needs to strengthen its economic credentials across the board) based
in Canberra and the field. The high
level Canberra-based technical capability needs to have an earlier input to
design processes (at the concept stage) and Executive management must decide
whether it also has a hard-gate veto role in approving designs.
Overall it would appear
that the Indonesia programme has not received much benefit from the thematic
groups in Canberra.
5.
Recommendations for the
Scaling Up of Australia’s Aid Programme in Indonesia and its Improved
Effectiveness
Scale up and greater effectiveness cannot happen without addressing
the corporate issues outlined above.
This has to be the top priority.
In addition, the following recommendations are offered:
·
5-year country strategies are
not serving an adequate purpose. A
shorter, broad strategy document should be prepared every five years to provide
a 10-15 year directional framework for the programme. Implementation strategies with clear
performance frameworks should be prepared every 24 months. Senior managers (SES
and Counsellors) should be held accountable for delivery against these
performance frameworks.
·
Budget funding should be aligned
with new two-year implementation strategies.
·
The three sectors where
significant scale-up can occur effectively, with widespread use of partner
government systems, are education, infrastructure and poverty
reduction/decentralisation. These three
sectors have also been selected by AusAID management for scale-up and the
thinking around how this can be done is generally good.
·
Evaluations need to be
conducted in a more systematic way, with more consistency of terms of reference
and with a stronger evidence-base for conclusions. Management responses should be specific and
followed-up rigorously. There should be
much greater consistency of monitoring and evaluation systems across the
programme.
·
AusAID should work to ensure
that so far as possible its programme monitoring and evaluation systems are in
fact Indonesian Government systems.
Having parallel monitoring and evaluation is not helpful and AusAID
should be prepared to invest in upgrading Indonesian skills and systems,
including statistical capacity. This
should be done ideally with other donors.
·
There needs to be further
consolidation of the programme.
Consideration should be given to getting out of some activities. A flexible funding mechanism should be
established to provide support for small, emerging activities, without
requiring large administrative infrastructure.
Some of these smaller activities should be experimental in nature. Trialling ideas should be encouraged,
including the prospect of some failures.
Successful activities would then be built up to scale.
·
The management of design
processes should be brought in-house.
Senior managers should be much more involved in design processes,
especially at the early concept stages.
Scope-creep through peer-reviews should be stopped. Managers responsible for slow or poor design processes
should be sanctioned (e.g. precluded from promotion for 24 months). AusAID will need to devote more resources to
design in Indonesia in the coming 18 months in order to meet the demands of
scaling-up the programme. This would be
a temporary requirement.
·
A significant portion of the
AusAID budget in Indonesia (e.g. 10%) should be set aside for a
whole-of-government fund. Departments
and agencies could apply competitively for multi-year funding. Decisions would be made by a committee
comprising the Ambassador, AusAID head of post, BAPPENAS Vice Minister and a
Deputy Secretary from PM&C. In time
all whole of government activities funded by AusAID would fall under this
mechanism.
·
For funding of activities
outside the AusAID budget, a coordination mechanism co-chaired by the
Ambassador and AusAID head of post should meet semi-annually to ensure proper
coherence and oversight.
·
DAP funding for DFAT should be
increased to $1m/year.
·
A senior level policy Inter-Departmental
Committee on Indonesia needs to meet regularly in Canbarra.
·
Realistically for any scale-up
to occur, significantly more funding will need to be channelled through the
World Bank and ADB and possibly other multilateral mechanisms. There is scope for writing down the cost of
IBRD loans through grant funding in some key sectors as well as providing more
grant support for design, implementation, anti-corruption and other
activities. However, AusAID in Jakarta
needs to be more assertive and influential over Bank activities and
performance. This needs to be linked to
a global strategy by AusAID and Treasury for engagement with the development
banks, which currently is sorely missing.
·
Funding to the infrastructure
sector can be scaled up significantly, especially in the areas of water and
sanitation (through the Government of Indonesia Hibah mechanism) and
roads. AusAID should stay engaged in
national roads and should not walk away from some of the gains achieved to
date. This should be funded through
another loan. If AusAID does not have
the appetite for another loan programme (which would be disappointing), then it
should fund one of the development banks to do so under very tight AusAID
management and quality control.
·
A significant scale-up in
funding can be delivered through the poverty and social protection programmes,
especially using PNPM as a delivery mechanism.
Some consolidation of activities in this area and decentralisation would
be desirable and more use should be made of the current practice of placing
senior staff in the provinces.
·
The education sector also
offers great scope for significant scaling-up of activities. Current AusAID thinking for expansion into
the tertiary sector is promising.
·
AusAID management should think
very seriously and quickly about the potential impact of the proposed new
Health Sector Support Programme. There
may be other more effective and efficient means to achieve improvements in
health outcomes e.g. through the social protection programmes which deliver
direct funding and benefits to the population.
·
AusAID and the Department of
Climate Change should revisit the efficacy of a second REDD demonstration
site.
·
More funding and attention
should be given to the economic governance sector which is performing
well. Public financial management
approaches need to be strengthened across the whole programme.
·
AusAID should develop a clear
strategy for its support of civil society in Indonesia and whether it sees it
as a deliverer of services or a means of advocacy and generating demand for
better service delivery (the latter seems the most relevant in the Indonesian
context). Programmes and funding then
need to align with this strategy rather than follow the current ad-hoc
approach.
·
AusAID should develop a
coherent approach to its work in democratic governance, including defining what
the term means. Both the elections and
law and justice designs are too complicated and should be simplified as
implementation commences.
·
AusAID should build up its
knowledge management which currently is very poor by global standards.
·
AusAID should finalise a
credible PAF for the whole country programme as soon as possible. The sector PAFs need to be consolidated
further and made more consistent.
Managers should be held accountable for their performance against sector
goals and follow-up to Annual Programme Performance Review recommendations.
TERMS
OF REFERENCE
Study
of Australia's Approach to Aid in Indonesia
1.1
The Australian Government has commissioned
an Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness (“the Review”). The Review will be
undertaken by a Panel of five persons, chaired by Mr Sandy Hollway AO.
1.2
As part of the Review, the
Panel will commission studies to assist in the overall analysis of the
effectiveness and efficiency of the Australian aid program. One of the
commissioned studies will examine and evaluate the scaling up of the Australian
aid program in Indonesia. The rationale for this is that the Indonesia program
was one of the first to scale up, and is now Australia’s largest bilateral aid
program. The study will likely be included as an Annex to the Review.
2.1
The objective of the Services
is to undertake the Study of Australia’s Approach to Aid in Indonesia as set
out below.
3.
SERVICES
3.1
The Contractor shall perform
the following Services in accordance with the terms and conditions of this
Contract:
(a)
Undertake a Study of
Australia’s Approach to Aid in Indonesia specifically addressing the following:
(i)
The scaling-up of the Australian
aid program in Indonesia, in particular:
(A)
the appropriate geographic
focus of the scaling up, taking into account the history of Australia’s
engagement in Indonesia and the total volume of Australia’s assistance relative
to development needs and other donors;
(B)
the appropriate sectoral focus
of the program, taking into account Australia’s areas of comparative advantage
and development impact;
(C)
the effectiveness and
efficiency of the different forms of aid that have been used to scale-up the
aid program, including bilateral projects and programs, partnerships with
multilateral organisations, working through partner government systems, and
engagement with civil society organisations;
(D)
the balance between technical
assistance and investments;
(E)
the lessons learnt from the
unusually high reliance of the Indonesia program on country partner systems;
and
(F)
the extent to which the program
suffers from, or has managed to avoid, problems of fragmentation.
(ii)
The performance of the aid
program in Indonesia based both on evaluations and less formal judgments of
individual evaluations, and an assessment of overall impact.
(iii)
Lessons from both the Australian
aid program and the programs of other donors on approaches to maximise
effectiveness and efficiency in Indonesia.
(iv)
The appropriate staffing resources
for the aid program in Indonesia and in Canberra, including:
(A)
an examination of the program’s
approach to efficiency and effectiveness and whether the current systems,
policies and procedures in place maximise effectiveness and appropriately
manage risks;
(B)
the impact of devolution;
(C)
the skills and capacity of
staff required to deliver the aid program; and
(D)
the extent and nature of
collaboration with other Australian government departments in the Indonesia
program.
Wed 19th Jan
|
12:15
– 13:00
|
Meeting
with Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction Section
·
Leonard
Simanjuntak – Decentralisation
·
Patricia
Bachtiar – Social Protection
·
Vanya
Abuthan – PNPM
·
Gita
Nasution – PNPM
·
Christine
Van Hooft – PNPM
·
Richard
Manning – AIPD
·
Irene
Insandjaja – ACCESS
·
Lulu
Wardhani – PNPM Micro Finance
·
Rani
Noerhadhie – Rural Development
|
Contact:
Petra Karetji, Counsellor Decentralisation
|
Video
Conference
|
|
CHARLES TAPP
TUESDAY 18th – FRIDAY 21st JANUARY 2011
MEETING SCHEDULE
|
Time
|
Meeting
|
Place/Contact
|
Status/Issues
|
|
||||
Tuesday,
18th January 2011
|
||||
|
9-10am
|
Meeting with
To discuss CBR prospective on Budget, HR
issues
|
Danielle Heinecke’s
|
Confirmed 17/01
*Erinch Sahan
|
|
10-11am
|
Meeting with
|
Lisa Rauter’s Office
|
Confirmed 17/01
*Erinch Sahan
|
|
11-12pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss design, evaluation, success,
impediments
|
Danielle’s Office
|
Confirmed
|
|
12-1:30pm
|
LUNCH BREAK/FREE TIME
|
LUNCH
BREAK/FREE TIME
|
LUNCH
BREAK/FREE TIME
|
|
1:30-2:30pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss WOG issues
|
2R3
|
Meeting Room Booked
Confirmed 17/01
|
|
2:30-3pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss CBR prospective on Budget, HR
issues
|
Danielle Heinecke’s
|
Confirmed
|
|
3-4pm
|
Meeting with
|
Laurie’s Office – Allara Street
|
*Sue Ellen
*Kate Fuller
|
|
4-5pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss Evaluations
|
Tony’s Office
|
Confirmed
|
Wednesday,
19th January 2011
|
||||
|
10-11am
|
Meeting with
|
Richard Moore’s Office – Level 5
|
Confirmed with SM 14/01
|
|
11-12pm
|
Telephone call with
|
Tony’s Office
|
Confirmed
|
|
12:30-2:pm
|
Meeting with
|
GR2
|
Meeting Room Booked
*Michael Collins
|
|
2-2:30pm
|
FREE TIME
|
FREE TIME
|
FREE TIME
|
|
2:45pm
|
|
|
|
|
3-4pm
|
Meeting with ANU
To discuss strategic directions/possible
scale up in Indonesia.
|
Hedley Bull Centre, Cnr Garran and
Liversidge, at the ANU
|
Confirmed
*Michael Collins
*Hannah Derwent
|
|
4:15pm
|
|
|
|
|
4:20pm-4:30pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss
consulting opportunities.
|
Tony’s Office
|
Confirmed
|
Thursday,
20th January 2011
|
||||
|
09:00-9:40am
|
Coffee with
|
TBA
|
Confirmed
|
|
10-11am
|
Meeting
with
For a
strategic overview of the Policy
|
GR5
|
Meeting Room Booked
*Danielle Heinecke
*Fiona MacIver
*Michael Collins
|
|
11-12pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss Government Partnerships Fund.
|
GR5
|
Meeting Room Booked
*Danielle Heinecke
*Luke Arnold
*Paul Zeccola
|
|
12:30-1:30pm
|
Phone call with
|
2R4
|
Meeting room booked
*Michael Collins
|
|
|
|
|
|
Friday,
21st January 2011
|
||||
|
09:30-10:00
|
Meeting with
|
2R1
|
Confirmed
|
|
10-11am
|
Meeting with
|
Tony’s Office
|
Confirmed
|
|
11am-12pm
|
FREE TIME
|
FREE TIME
|
FREE TIME
|
|
12:00-12:30pm
|
|
|
|
|
12:30-2:30pm
|
Lunch with Hugh Borrowman
|
Wasabi Restaurant in Manuka
|
Booked under Borrowman and Confirmed
14/01
|
|
2:30-2:45pm
|
|
|
|
|
3-4pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss the role of delivering ODA and
Counter Terrorism and Security and Trans border issues in Indonesia.
|
GR1
|
Meeting Room Booked – All attendees
confirmed
*Fiona MacIver
*Luke Arnold
|
|
04:30-5:15
|
Meeting with
|
TBA
|
|
Monday,
24th January 2011
|
||||
|
10-11am
|
Meeting with Key Advisers
Ben David (HEALTH), Gillian Brown
(GENDER), Alwyn Chilver (RURAL/ENV) to discuss role of thematic groups and
Indonesia Scale Up.
|
2R2
|
Meeting Room Booked
*Sue Ellen
|
|
11:30-12:30pm
|
Teleconference with
To discuss the role of civil society in
the aid program for Indonesia.
|
Teleconference
dialling details
1800 332
147
participant
code 6019 4503 press #
|
Confirmed
|
|
12:30-2:00pm
|
Lunch with
|
TBA
|
Confirmed
|
|
2:30-3:30pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss Strategic Reform
|
James’ Office – Level 5
|
Confirmed
|
|
3:30-4:30pm
|
Meeting with
To discuss Recruitment, Postings and Pre
Posting Training.
|
Blair’s Office – Level 5
|
Confirmed
*Danielle Heinecke
|
Tuesday,
25th January 2011
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thursday,
27th January 2011
|
||||
|
11am -12pm
|
Tele
conference with
|
|
Confirmed
|
Tuesday
1st February 2011
|
||||
|
08:30-9:30
|
Teleconference
with
|
|
Confirmed
|
6.
Assessment of the Current
Australian Aid Programme to Indonesia
1.1 The scaling up of
the aid programme to Indonesia (from $120m/year in 2003 to $450m/year in 2010)
has for the most part been achieved successfully, both in terms of overall
effectiveness and efficiency.
1.2 The Country Strategy for the period 2008-2013 (The Australia
Indonesia partnership Country Strategy 2008-2013) remains partially relevant,
though there is not full alignment with the Indonesian Government’s new medium
term development plan.
1.3 The current aid
programme is too fragmented and requires further consolidation.
1.4 The Government of
Indonesia’s view of the Australian aid programme is very positive at all
levels.
1.5 There is a very
strong commitment to performance management within AusAID and some good
progress is being made.
1.6 AusAID Indonesia
is good at ensuring evaluations and reviews occur and the quality of some of
them is high, though many suffer from a lack of evidence to support findings
and recommendations. There is little
consistency in their terms of reference, objectives and even in clarifying what
they are for and for whom.
1.7 The AusAID
programme in Indonesia is more aligned with Indonesian government systems than
most other parts of the bilateral aid programme. There is great diversity in the forms of aid
and for the most part this diversity is well considered and appropriate.
1.8 The Australian
whole of government aid effort presents a very mixed scorecard. There has been no consolidation of whole of
government activities in spite of clear evaluation recommendations in 2007. Whole of government implementation support
and oversight accounts for well over 20% of AusAID staff time for less than 10%
of the aid budget.
1.9 The performance of
the multilateral agencies supported by the aid programme is variable.
1.10 AusAID needs to
rethink its claimed development approach to the East (and is already beginning
to do so) and whether any specific focus is indeed desirable. At the very least
a better communications effort on geographic focus is required.
1.11 The timeliness,
efficiency and costs of AusAID programme (and project) design processes leave a
great deal to be desired.
1.12 The infrastructure
sector is well managed, achieving some significant policy and practical results
and is greatly appreciated by the Government of Indonesia. Overall AusAID has administered loans in the
education and transport sector effectively and efficiently.
1.13 Australian support
to the education sector has been well considered and managed and has achieved
tangible positive outcomes at a reasonable cost-effectiveness. AusAID’s plans for further support to the
sector are sensible and have the prospect of building considerably on successes
to date. The decision to scale up
further in the education sector is correct.
1.14 The Health sector
is performing well in the HIV & Aids arena, but more poorly on the broader
health systems side.
1.15 Performance of the
democratic governance sector is mixed, not least due to a lack of clarity over
what exactly is meant by the term “democratic governance”. AusAID needs to assess both its views on the
funding of democracy and also of how it seeks to make use of civil society in
the programme.
1.16 The climate change
sector is having mixed results with the development of a carbon accounting
system and support to the GoI Green Paper process being stand-out successes. Questions remain over the efficacy and value
for money of a second REDD demonstration.
1.17 The economic
governance sector is performing well, even though it is only a small part of
the overall programme.
1.18 The recent work in
poverty reduction and social protection has been excellent and some of the
decentralisation support work is also very good.
1.19 AusAID has
generally responded well to disasters and the legacy of its effective support
in Aceh remains very positive in the bilateral relationship.
7.
Corporate Issues and
Obstacles to Further Scaling-up of the Programme
Corporate lacunae and impediments and poor management are hindering
greater effectiveness of the programme.
2.2 The sheer operational
delivery demands of the Indonesia programme are immense, requiring highly
developed management and aid delivery skills and experience. What is required of management is excellent
operational aid delivery experience and excellent public service
skills.
2.3 Over the past four
years the Canberra budget process has effectively driven the evolution of the programme, not the Country
Strategy. RECOMMENDATION: Funding should be provided to AusAID for its broad
programmes, not sectoral budget measures.
2.4 The year-end
spending imperative is leading to inefficient and ineffective use of funds in
the final couple of months of the financial year. RECOMMENDATION:
A six-month carry-over facility is necessary for the Indonesia programme and
AusAID as a whole, especially when dealing with the relative unpredictability
of timing of expenditure through partner government systems and budgets. Loan funding should be treated differently to
grant funding and should only have a “life of loan” stricture, not financial
year spending requirements.
2.5 By most measures
devolution of the Indonesia programme has been successful: the quality of the
programme has increased, has much greater policy influence, is significantly
more relevant to the Indonesian government and is being administered efficiently
and effectively. RECOMMENDATION:
It would be a mistake to re-centralise programme management. The key to further scaling up will be to
increase the experience and capability of SES management and mid-level
management in AusAID. This capability
should include aid management, public service skills, technical skills and
people management skills.
2.6 AusAID human resources systems are acting as an impediment
to the efficient management and effectiveness of the programme. RECOMMENDATION:
A major overhaul of AusAID’s HR systems is necessary as a matter of urgency.
2.7 A significant
number of AusAID A-based staff in Jakarta do not have the requisite skills and
experience needed to perform their jobs properly. RECOMMENDATIONS:
At a minimum all posted staff should receive six months of language training
and should also receive proper training in public financial management and
forms of aid. All Counsellors should
have prior aid delivery experience overseas.
AusAID should establish a programme to ensure staff moving up through
the system have adequate overseas experience, including introducing compulsory
overseas secondments within the graduate programme.
2.8 There is a real
danger that if consultancy rates are set too low under the new remuneration framework,
AusAID will lose some extremely important and effective individuals.
2.9 The scope and
complexity of the job of the head of AusAID in Indonesia is significantly
greater than normally expected of an Assistant Secretary. RECOMMENDATION: The position of head of
AusAID in Jakarta should be at the First Assistant Ssecretary level, supported
by 2 Assistant Secretary positions, one for policy and strategy and one for
operations. The Assistant Secretary in
Canberra should report to the Jakarta-based First Assistant Secretary, who in
turn would report to the Deputy Secretary.
2.10 There is far too
much paperwork, reports and processes in AusAID. On a very subjective assessment of the
Indonesia programme, something between 50-70% of reports, documents, processes
and briefs do not lead to any decisions or actions. RECOMMENDATIONS:
AusAID needs to undertake a fundamental review of its reporting and business
processes to create much greater simplicity and efficiency. Until this is done it would be premature to
determine future staffing levels since greater efficiency and simplification
would free up capacity of existing staff.
2.11 Senior managers are
not always focusing on the right things.
2.12 Management needs to
overhaul its approach to risk management and introduce proper accountability
for risk mitigation. RECOMMENDATION:
The Indonesia programme needs to
establish a proper, operational risk management register and nominate someone
as Risk Administrator (the Operations Manager would be the obvious choice).
2.13 The Indonesia
programme is poor at saying no to new initiatives
2.14 The AusAID
Indonesia team is under-performing when it comes to timeliness of programme expenditure
2.15 Overall it would
appear that the Indonesia programme has not received much benefit from the
thematic groups in Canberra.
8.
Recommendations for the
Scaling Up of Australia’s Aid Programme in Indonesia and its Improved
Effectiveness
Scale up and greater effectiveness cannot happen without addressing
the corporate issues outlined above.
This has to be the top priority.
In addition, the following recommendations are offered:
·
5-year country strategies are
not serving an adequate purpose. A
shorter, broad strategy document should be prepared every five years to provide
a 10-15 year directional framework for the programme. Implementation strategies with clear
performance frameworks should be prepared every 24 months. Senior managers (SES
and Counsellors) should be held accountable for delivery against these performance
frameworks.
·
Budget funding should be aligned
with new two-year implementation strategies.
·
The three sectors where
significant scale-up can occur effectively, with widespread use of partner
government systems, are education, infrastructure and poverty
reduction/decentralisation. These three
sectors have also been selected by AusAID management for scale-up and the
thinking around how this can be done is generally good.
·
Evaluations need to be
conducted in a more systematic way, with more consistency of terms of reference
and with a stronger evidence-base for conclusions. Management responses should be specific and
followed-up rigorously. There should be
much greater consistency of monitoring and evaluation systems across the
programme.
·
AusAID should work to ensure
that so far as possible its programme monitoring and evaluation systems are in
fact Indonesian Government systems.
Having parallel monitoring and evaluation is not helpful and AusAID
should be prepared to invest in upgrading Indonesian skills and systems,
including statistical capacity. This
should be done ideally with other donors.
·
There needs to be further
consolidation of the programme.
Consideration should be given to getting out of some activities. A flexible funding mechanism should be
established to provide support for small, emerging activities, without
requiring large administrative infrastructure.
Some of these smaller activities should be experimental in nature. Trialling ideas should be encouraged,
including the prospect of some failures.
Successful activities would then be built up to scale.
·
The management of design
processes should be brought in-house.
Senior managers should be much more involved in design processes,
especially at the early concept stages.
Scope-creep through peer-reviews should be stopped. Managers responsible for slow or poor design
processes should be sanctioned (e.g. precluded from promotion for 24
months). AusAID will need to devote more
resources to design in Indonesia in the coming 18 months in order to meet the
demands of scaling-up the programme.
This would be a temporary requirement.
·
A significant portion of the
AusAID budget in Indonesia (e.g. 10%) should be set aside for a
whole-of-government fund. Departments
and agencies could apply competitively for multi-year funding. Decisions would be made by a committee
comprising the Ambassador, AusAID head of post, BAPPENAS Vice Minister and a
Deputy Secretary from PM&C. In time
all whole of government activities funded by AusAID would fall under this
mechanism.
·
For funding of activities
outside the AusAID budget, a coordination mechanism co-chaired by the
Ambassador and AusAID head of post should meet semi-annually to ensure proper
coherence and oversight.
·
DAP funding for DFAT should be
increased to $1m/year.
·
A senior level policy Inter-Departmental
Committee on Indonesia needs to meet regularly in Canbarra.
·
Realistically for any scale-up
to occur, significantly more funding will need to channelled through the World
Bank and ADB and possibly other multilateral mechanisms. There is scope for writing down the cost of
IBRD loans through grant funding in some key sectors as well as providing more
grant support for design, implementation, anti-corruption and other
activities. However, AusAID in Jakarta
needs to be more assertive and influential over Bank activities and
performance. This needs to be linked to
a global strategy by AusAID and Treasury for engagement with the development
banks, which currently is sorely missing.
·
Funding to the infrastructure
sector can be scaled up significantly, especially in the areas of water and
sanitation (through the Government of Indonesia Hibah mechanism) and
roads. AusAID should stay engaged in
national roads and should not walk away from some of the gains achieved to
date. This should be funded through
another loan. If AusAID does not have
the appetite for another loan programme (which would be disappointing), then it
should fund one of the development banks to do so under very tight AusAID
management and quality control.
·
A significant scale-up in
funding can be delivered through the poverty and social protection programmes,
especially using PNPM as a delivery mechanism.
Some consolidation of activities in this area and decentralisation would
be desirable and more use should be made of the current practice of placing
senior staff in the provinces.
·
The education sector also
offers great scope for significant scaling-up of activities. Current AusAID thinking for significant
expansion into the tertiary sector is promising.
·
AusAID management should think
very seriously and quickly about the potential impact of the proposed new
Health Sector Support Programme. There
may be other more effective and efficient means to achieve improvements in
health outcomes e.g. through the social protection programmes which deliver
direct funding and benefits to the population.
·
AusAID and the Department of
Climate Change should revisit the efficacy of a second REDD demonstration
site.
·
More funding and attention
should be given to the economic governance sector which is performing
well. Public financial management
approaches need to be strengthened across the whole programme.
·
AusAID should develop a clear
strategy for its support of civil society in Indonesia and whether it sees it
as a deliverer of services or a means of advocacy and generating demand for
better service delivery (the latter seems the most relevant in the Indonesian
context). Programmes and funding then
need to align with this strategy rather than follow the current ad-hoc
approach.
·
AusAID should develop a
coherent approach to its work in democratic governance, including defining what
the term means. Both the elections and
law and justice designs are too complicated and should be simplified as
implementation commences.
·
AusAID should build up its
knowledge management which currently is very poor by global standards.
·
AusAID should finalise a
credible PAF for the whole country programme as soon as possible. The sector PAFs need to be consolidated
further and made more consistent.
Managers should be held accountable for their performance against sector
goals and follow-up to Annual Programme Performance Review recommendations.