CONFLICT
AND SOCIAL PROTECTION: SOCIAL PROTECTION IN SITUATIONS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT AND
ITS AFTERMATH
Theme
paper 5
September
2004
Content
By James Darcy
Correspondence to:
James Darcy
ODI
111 Westminster Bridge Road
SE1 7JD
Email: j.darcy@odi.org.uk
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose, scope and definitions
The purpose of this paper is to supplement and inform the
DfID social protection position paper in relation to situations of armed
conflict or violent insecurity. It considers in particular the role of social
protection in the aftermath of war, in what are commonly referred to (sometimes
misleadingly) as ‘post-conflict’ contexts.
This can be seen as part of a wider discussion about
people’s ability to withstand and recover from severe shocks. Apart from the
effects of conflict, this includes the human impact of natural hazards of
various kinds, including drought; and the impact on the household of severe
macro-economic shocks, including the collapse of national economies or of
commodity prices in world markets. The human impact of such events may be
catastrophic, resulting in the kinds of acute deprivation that are the subject
of international humanitarian responses. For many, these ‘extraordinary’ events
or processes are in fact a recurrent feature of life. Together with the gradual
erosion of livelihoods that may already be marginal, such events contribute to
levels of impoverishment that lead to chronic vulnerability. One of the results
is the perpetuation of levels of infant and maternal mortality that are
chronically high, a concern central to the Millennium Development Goals. In the
case of chronically conflict-affected areas, what would otherwise be considered
abnormally high mortality rates and levels of acute malnutrition may have become
the norm rather the exception – and so may not be accorded the priority they
deserve.
The concept of social
protection implies some prior notion of social (in)security – in other words, it demands some understanding of the
range of risks against which people are said to require protection. Definitions
of social protection tend to centre on economic risks, particularly those
relating to loss of income[1].
Yet loss of income or wage earning opportunities and other economic shocks are
part of a range of factors that bear on the security of the family, particularly in conflict situations. The concept of
human security – ‘freedom from fear
and freedom from want’ – captures this idea, though in itself it is too broad
and ill-defined to provide a conceptual basis for social protection. Human
security demands a concept of protection that encompasses threats of violence
and persecution, coercion and deliberate deprivation, as well as protection
against loss of entitlement and economic vicissitudes. Fear and want are often
closely linked, most obviously in cases of forced displacement. In situations
of violent insecurity, and in the aftermath of conflict, social protection must be understood in relation to this wider
domain of risk.
For the purposes of this paper, social protection is
understood to involve acts and measures designed to protect people against
socially unacceptable levels of risk and deprivation (adapted from Conway et al., 2000). This paper focuses on the
welfare aspect of social protection, rather than the socially ‘transformative’
aspects. It considers in particular measures designed to ensure people’s
sustained access to basic needs (universally or socially defined) in unstable
or disrupted environments, including adequate food and water, clothing, health
care and housing; and for children, access to primary education. Some of the
diverse means of achieving are considered below, ranging from targeted or
general transfers (e.g. of cash, food), and provision of free or subsidised
services, to public works and other employment schemes, and income or
livelihood support schemes more generally. The question of formal and
non-formal roles and responsibilities for social protection is discussed in
relation to conflict and post-conflict environments. Finally, the paper
considers the relationship between social protection measures and post-conflict
transition and recovery.
Given the focus on conflict-related forms of insecurity
and the response to them, some further working definitions are needed here.
·
‘Violent insecurity’ is used here as an umbrella
term to describe all situations involving levels of violence or coercion that
significantly affect the security of the civilian population (or parts of it)
in the area concerned. This may be a localised phenomenon or more extensive,
and may be the result of armed conflict, state repression, criminal activity or
general lawlessness.
·
‘Conflict’ is used here as shorthand for any
situation involving extensive and protracted violent conflict between competing
parties. It constitutes one form of violent insecurity.
·
‘War’ and ‘armed conflict’ are used more
specifically, to denote situations to which the provisions of international
humanitarian law (IHL) apply.[2]
These involve a certain level of armed hostilities between a state and other
state(s); between a state and organised faction(s) within the state; or between
such factions.
A situation described as
‘post-war’ or ‘post-conflict’ may yet involve a high degree of violent
insecurity. Experience suggests that a simple distinction between ‘conflict’
and ‘post-conflict’ (or, pace
Tolstoy, between ‘war’ and ‘peace’) cuts across the reality of differential
insecurity that characterises many of the situations under discussion. It is
this reality that largely determines both the need for social protection and
the conditions under which it is provided.
The paper considers the following questions in particular:
1.1.1 Social protection during conflict
·
What constitutes ‘social insecurity’ and ‘social
protection’ in conflict situations?
·
What forms of social protection are possible in
the course of armed conflict?
·
To what extent is the social protection agenda
in these contexts necessarily a basic welfare
agenda, and what are its key constituents?
·
What is the role of non-state (civil society) actors
in social protection? To what extent does the international humanitarian
apparatus fulfil the necessary role of basic service and commodity provision?
1.1.2 Social protection in the aftermath of conflict
·
What characterises social insecurity in
post-conflict situations? What does this imply for social protection
strategies?
·
What role does social protection play in a
post-conflict recovery process? How does it relate to economic recovery more
broadly?
·
What are the implications for the role of the
governing authorities?
The rest of the paper attempts
to sketch the likely answers to these questions, or to suggest the range of
options within which the answers might lie, based on a (non-exhaustive) review
of existing research and other evidence.
1.2 Applying the concept of social protection to contexts of violent insecurity and the aftermath of war
The concept of social protection implies a notion of
security that, as commonly understood, refers to security of income and
livelihood – both in the sense of their adequacy to meet basic needs, and
resilience to shocks. When applied to conflict situations or violently insecure
environments, this concept needs some adaptation. Indeed, its value as an
organising concept may be limited in such circumstances, where the language of
‘crisis’ and relief assistance, and of emergency service provision, implies a
generalised and catastrophic loss of coping capacity affecting whole
communities. In the most extreme cases of conflict-related crisis, such as Rwanda in 1994 or Darfur today, where
the primary concern is with protection from the threat of mass killings, rape,
‘ethnic cleansing’ and forced displacement – and the consequent risk of
starvation and epidemic – social protection takes on a different connotation
again. Even in less extreme circumstances, people are exposed to multiple forms
of insecurity, and that insecurity may cut across the social spectrum in the
areas affected.[3]
There are several aspects to this. First, as noted above,
conflict creates a range of risks that extends well beyond the economic.
Vulnerability to threats of violence and coercion themselves arguably forms a
necessary part of the social protection agenda, especially where that
vulnerability is itself a function of poverty and marginalisation. Second, such
threats have a significant bearing on people’s ability to meet their
subsistence needs. Conflict impoverishes people in both the short and the
longer term, and commonly prevents people from pursuing their normal
livelihoods: fields and markets may become inaccessible, normal trade patterns
are disrupted, employment opportunities vanish, assets are lost, and so on.[4]
Third, the society against which social security it judged is often in turmoil.
Communities and families are torn apart, separated, even at war with each
other. This damage to the social fabric results in generalised ‘social
insecurity’ of the kind seen in the Balkans recent years, in which social
exclusion may take extreme forms such as forced ethnic separation. Against this
backdrop, a narrow definition of social protection has limited application.
Given the persistence of such effects in the aftermath of
war this caveat must be extended to the ‘post-conflict’ period as well. The
social protection agenda has to take account of conflict-related forms of
insecurity; and must be seen as part of a wider human security agenda that
encompasses protection from intimidation and coercion.
Some have analysed the causes and effects of conflict in
terms of the loss social capital and
the consequent breakdown of social
cohesion. It is argued that building social capital is a prerequisite both
of conflict prevention and of social and economic development (Colletta &
Cullen, 2000:4). Social capital is understood as having roughly two dimensions:
a ‘horizontal’ dimension representing the bonds that unite people within and
between different social groups, and a ‘vertical’ dimension representing the
relationship between state, markets and laws on the one hand, and communities
and individuals on the other. The extent of social cohesion is seen primarily
as a function of these two factors. On the horizontal axis, trust in particular is seen as a key
determinant of social cohesion (Fukuyama, 1995) and an extreme loss of trust is
seen as characteristic of conflict and its aftermath. The corollary is that
re-establishing trust in various forms of relationship is essential to the
process of recovery.
Nee (1996, pp.21-3) writes from personal experience in
Cambodia:
In the Khmer Rouge time
trust was systematically destroyed. A friend would be asked to spy upon a
friend... As trust was broken we reached a time when we could think only of
ourselves and our great needs; the dignity and pride in our identity, formerly
an important part of our lives, entirely disappeared.’
There is clearly a relationship
between social protection and social capital/cohesion. Broadly speaking, a
state that has high levels of social cohesion in the sense described above will
have low levels of social exclusion, will be relatively equitable, and will
provide high levels of access and opportunity. The need for social protection
will be relatively less, and the climate for providing it relatively
favourable. Conversely, in the situations under consideration here, with often
very low levels of social cohesion, the need for protection is likely to be
high but the conditions for providing may be very unfavourable. Devereux
(2003:5) describes this as the ‘Catch 22 of social protection’.
This paper considers those situations in which the threats
posed to human security are often generalised threats. It is important to
distinguish:
1.
Systems designed to help vulnerable individuals
/households within a community cope with loss of income or other shocks.
2.
Systems designed to assist whole populations,
communities or groups within them survive and recover from catastrophic
co-variant shocks
In some cases, the social
protection agenda in conflict or transitional situations may include the
restoration of access to basic commodities and services for whole communities.
This is not to ignore the issue of specific vulnerabilities, but to recognise
that the relevant ‘unit of analysis’ in thinking about social protection may
need to be bigger than the individual or household – and that access to
services, in particular, depends on there being services to access.
2 Social protection in contexts of violent insecurity
2.1 Forms and determinants of conflict-related human insecurity
The concern here is with people’s ability to withstand the
often extreme forms of risk and vulnerability related to violent insecurity.
There are two main dimensions to this:
(i) Vulnerability to relatively acute shocks, e.g. a
sudden mass displacement of people fleeing actual or anticipated violence.
Apart from the immediate effects of violence and terror (death, injury, trauma,
flight), the symptoms may include loss of assets (including land), temporary
loss of access to essential commodities and services, increased risk of
epidemic disease, disruption or loss of livelihoods, and a short to medium-term
crisis of food security. There may also be a high incidence of psycho-social
trauma.
(ii) Vulnerability to the effects of prolonged crisis, in
the form of chronic conflict and displacement extending over many years.[5]
This may be precipitated by and interspersed with sudden shocks followed by
periods, not necessarily of recovery, but of adaptation to changed
circumstances. Chronic food insecurity, nutritional deficits and associated
increases in mortality and morbidity may all be symptoms. Education and health services
are likely to be massively disrupted in the affected regions. Livelihoods are
adapted and may incorporate unsustainable survival strategies. Dependency on
external assistance (food aid or other) is often high, and chronic.
Both forms of vulnerability are likely entail high levels
of extreme impoverishment. The state itself is often weak in such circumstances
and its capacity to provide services drastically curtailed or non-existent.
Depending on the precipitating event(s), infrastructure (locally, nationally)
may be largely destroyed, and large numbers displaced from their homes. As the
cases of Angola and the DR Congo show, prolonged internal displacement can have
catastrophic effects on people’s survival chances (Roberts et al., 2003). In some cases (e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan), conflict
and environmental factors may combine to compound people’s vulnerability. The
Kuchi in Afghanistan are one example of a group for whom the combined effects
of war and drought made a previously viable livelihood untenable.
More generally, there are a number of demographic effects
that typically result from the effects of armed conflict. In particular, an
increase in numbers of female-headed households and of orphaned children, as
well as the loss of male labour capacity, is common. These factors have a
direct bearing on household dependency ratios, on form of vulnerability, and on
the social protection agenda generally.
In short, the need for protection in a broader sense
relates both to the threat of violence and coercion, and to the consequences of
these, including acute impoverishment and social exclusion. The determinants of
social insecurity at a time of major social upheaval range well beyond income
poverty, and may have as much to do with (say) ethnicity as with economics.
The issue of civil status and identity can have a major
bearing on social security. A loss or alteration of status is a common
characteristic of people who have been displaced from their homes. This is
often compounded by lost or contested property rights. Lost or destroyed
identity cards may make accessing services difficult, and may render the
individuals concerned vulnerable to harassment by the security services. Many
of the most vulnerable lack full citizenship rights, and may even be stateless (as
for example the Rohingyas in Burma). This has clear implications for social
protection strategies: lack of status or inferior status not only limits
opportunity and can result in high degrees of vulnerability and discrimination.
2.2 Defining responsibilities for social protection during conflict
At the national and sub-national level, the
responsibilities of the state and its institutions may be more or less clearly
defined in legal and policy terms. The formal legal and normative framework for
social protection in conflict-related situations consists of elements of
international law (human rights law, international humanitarian law, refugee
law); elements of national constitutional, statutory and common law; and
existing national or sub-national policy and regulatory frameworks. To the list
of formally-defined responsibilities should be added the formal mandates of
various international bodies, including for example the statute of the Office
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and that of the UN Relief and Works
Association in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
While some of these provisions give rise to specific
entitlements to welfare assistance, these may be difficult or impossible to
enforce in the situations in question. Moreover, the normative provisions are
limited. There is, for example, no universal legal entitlement to relief
assistance. The Geneva Conventions make specific provision in the case of armed
conflict, though even here the duty to allow provision of relief by third
parties is limited and permission for particular relief actions is generally
made conditional on the consent of the warring parties.[6]
The right to life provision in Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (as interpreted by the UN Human Rights Committee),
together with Articles 11 and 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, provide some legal underpinning for a
right to welfare assistance, while not in themselves creating individual
entitlements.[7]
While armed conflict may cause the cessation of public
services, governments remain responsible for the welfare of the civilian
population, and this may be recognised in various ways. The Government of Sri
Lanka, for example, maintained its administrative presence and at least
vestigial functions in the contested northern areas of the country. Perhaps
more importantly, it recognised the obligation to allow relief supplies to be
transported across battle lines, though it was often accused of ‘rationing’ the
right to life by unreasonably refusing permission for essential supplies.
Other rules of international humanitarian law are relevant
here. Starvation as a method of war is forbidden. So too is the destruction of
‘objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population’, including
crops, livestock and drinking water sources, as well as essential medical
supplies.[8] In
other words, the obligation to ensure the welfare of the civilian population
relates not just to the provision of services, but to the methods used to
prosecute war itself. The principle of distinction between civil and
military targets is central to this.
2.3 Roles and approaches to social protection
Much of the effective role of social protection during
conflict is played by non-formal actors. Civil society institutions –
including, for example, the church, mosque or temple – often play a central
role in providing for those who have lost the means to support themselves. In
insecure environments, where government services may have ceased, such bodies
may provide an essential welfare and information service. More generally,
communities themselves, particularly through extended family networks, provide
support for the most vulnerable – though their ability to do so may be limited
when insecurity is a generalised phenomenon, and where protracted crisis has
eroded income and assets across the board. Remittances and voluntary donations
by communities in exile may be significant (though generally unquantified)
factors in supporting those affected.[9]
The hosting of internally displaced populations by neighbouring communities is
another common manifestation of non-formal support, and one that may impose a
severe burden on the host community itself.
As Dean (2004) points out, an overemphasis on the role and
responsibility of the state for welfare provision – and the stressing of contractarian over solidarity aspects of welfare responsibility – risks losing sight
of the essential fact of social interdependence. This is all the more important
in the kinds of situation under consideration here. This does not, of course,
mean that notions of rights and welfare entitlements cease to be relevant –
though their relevance is to some extent conditioned by circumstance in each
case. Rather, it should alert us to the reality that non-formal mechanisms for
social protection are likely to bear a particularly heavy burden, especially
where conflict and political instability have caused a breakdown of formal
(state/governmental) mechanisms, or even led to policies of deliberate
exclusion. Support to non-formal mechanisms may indeed be one of the more
effective forms of intervention for social protection – allowing that their
capacity and scope will be limited, even where they have relatively greater
scope for operating in conditions of prevailing insecurity.
How then is this burden shared? In some cases, it is not:
people may simply not have access to assistance in the form of food
distributions, income support, free health care or other essential services.
This may be the result of a generalised loss of entitlement, perhaps due to
displacement, compounded by the breakdown both of state-run services and of
normal community support mechanisms. The breakdown of state-provided services
may be taken as the trigger for international humanitarian service provision:
in North Korea, for example, the dramatic decline in the late 1990s of food
supplies going through the public distribution service (on which there was a
high level of dependency) was a key determinant of the decision to provide
massive international food aid. A similar catastrophic result was predicted by
some before the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies in 2003.
National or local non-governmental agencies may play a
more or less significant role in filling the services gap. These may be
community-based, a direct expression of social solidarity, or more centralised,
as with the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In either case, they
are likely to be heavily dependent on voluntary contributions and voluntary
labour, both of which may be hard to secure in the context of violent conflict.
They may also be politicised and partial in their provision of assistance: who
gets help may be a matter of political allegiance, ethnicity or religion.
Equally, it may be a matter of which areas are safely accessible by member of a
certain group in the fractured environment of armed conflict.
Such CBOs and NGOs may receive international support, but
the partnership mode of international engagement is more a feature of natural
disasters than complex political emergencies – in part because of the issues of
neutrality and impartiality alluded to above. For the same reason, the
‘substitutory’ mode of service provision in conflict-affected areas –
establishing health care, food distribution and other mechanisms that are
independent of government structures – is characteristic of international
humanitarian responses, particularly where the government in question is one of
belligerents. In practice, the consent of the belligerents is essential to the
establishment of such services, and the negotiation of secure access for
service provision may be on a more or less formal basis (as for example with
Operation Lifeline Sudan) or on an ad hoc
basis.
The issue of the responsibility of belligerents for the
welfare of those living in the territory they control is thrown into sharp
relief when considering the role of third-party humanitarian actors. Formal
(legal, political) responsibility does not change; yet one line of criticism of
international humanitarian interventions are that they serves to undermine the
social/political contract between people and government, or between people and
the de facto controlling authority.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the ICRC withdrew from
assistance provision in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2003 on the
grounds that it could not continue to fulfil what was properly the
responsibility of the occupying power.
Local civil society actors, alone or with external
resourcing, may play the critical role in social protection during conflict.
One comparative study of social capital and social protection in war-affected
states found that, in the cases of Somalia and Guatemala, ‘Civil society in both countries substituted for state roles by
becoming the main provider of safety nets and basic services, especially for
vulnerable groups, in the context of a failed state (Somalia) and an oppressive
exclusionary state (Guatemala).’ (Colletta & Cullen, 2000:70).
International interventions have been criticised for failing to acknowledge and
work with local institutions (see for example Harris & Lewis p.120, in
Harris, ed. 1999).
At the macro level, the World Bank’s LICUS initiative was
a response to the weakening of the legitimacy of public institutions and the
decay in the performance of social service ministries in the countries
concerned (Harmer, 2004) The consequent decline in the reach of government
services was felt to pose a fundamental challenge to improvements in human
development. The Bank’s response – to work through civil society organisations
in such situations – has been criticised for undermining the capacity of the
state through an over-emphasis on non-public (NGO, social fund,
private-for-profit) provision of services. In practice, these non-governmental
organisations face many of the same operational constraints that hamper public
service delivery.
This question of substitution of government functions
becomes a particular issue in the aftermath of war. Most of the situations under
consideration here are ones in which the capacity of the government to fulfil
its sovereign responsibility – including the ability to ensure the safety and
welfare of its population – has been seriously eroded. The consequent vacuum of
governance may extend well beyond the cessation of hostilities, a fact which
poses severe challenges for the design of appropriate and sustainable social
protection mechanisms.
2.3.1 The developing role of the World Bank in conflict situations[10]
Traditionally, the International Financial Institutions
have been concerned with the macro-economic underpinnings of growth. However,
over the last decade the World Bank’s policy has shifted from a concentration
on macroeconomics to a focus on the political and social determinants of growth.
In line with this, the Bank has developed a wide variety of instruments to
respond to conflict-affected countries and countries in transition.
The Bank, from its very origins, has played a role in
post-war reconstruction. But
in the late 1990s, it began to espouse the potential role of development
assistance in preventing conflict
(World Bank, 2003). During this time the Bank sought to re-interpret its
mandate, from an institution that sits on the outskirts of war, waiting for
conflict to end and a focus on rebuilding infrastructure once the conflict had
passed (the Reconstruction mandate) to an institution that aims to both
prevent conflict, engage where possible during times of conflict, and assist
vulnerable groups in the transition from conflict – the Development mandate.
In line with this shift in focus and in response to the
findings from a critical evaluation (World Bank, 1998), in 2001 the Bank
adopted an Operational Policy which legitimised the Bank’s work in countries
before conflicts ended.[11]
This states that:
(i) In “countries vulnerable
to conflict”, the Bank will use its usual instruments to promote growth and
poverty reduction;
(ii) In “countries in
conflict” the Bank will continue its efforts towards poverty reduction and
maintain ‘socio-economic assets’ where possible; and
(iii) In “countries in
transition from conflict”, the Bank will support recovery and development
through investment and development policy advice, with particular attention to
the needs of vulnerable war-affected groups.
The Bank’s involvement in war-affected economies pre-dates
this policy. In Angola, for example, a social fund (the FAS) was established in
1994 by the Bank and bilateral donors to support projects initiated and
implemented by communities (de Sousa et
al in Addison, 2003, p.43). The aim of the FAS was to ‘improve access to basic services through the provision and
rehabilitation of basic infrastructure (for example schools, health facilities,
water supply and sanitation...) ...and to create additional income and
employment especially in rural and peri-urban areas’ (ibid., p.44). In
addition, it provided support to sub-projects identified and managed by
communities, in a deliberate attempt to create a bottom-up approach that did
not depend on the ‘cumbersome state apparatus and its lack of poverty focus’.
Subsequent beneficiary surveys recorded that some 63% of respondents had
benefited from the FAS, and that their stated top priorities were education
(68%) and access to health services (23%).
Box 1 gives the recent example of a World Bank social
protection initiative in the Palestinian Occupied Territory - a context of
violent insecurity and of occupation, where the responsibility of the occupying
power (Israel) is disputed, and where long-standing international assistance
mechanisms (particularly UNRWA) have struggled to fulfil a social protection
role.
Box 1 Social security in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories
In June 2004, with the stated aim of supporting the
Palestinian Authority (PA) in meeting an increased demand for social
assistance, the World Bank launched a Social Safety Net Reform Project with an
initial financing of US$10 million.
This project is designed to assist the Ministry of Social
Affairs to reform and expand its main social assistance instrument known as the
Social Hardship Cases (SHC) Program. This Program provides regular cash
assistance, food donations and health insurance provision to about 36,000
beneficiary families (about 120,000 individuals). According to a World Bank
press release, ‘Funding shortages have occurred during the last three years
amidst a climate of increased social vulnerability, PA fiscal difficulties and
the ongoing crisis with Israel.’
The Bank’s project contains three components:
(i) financing of a SHC reform program consisting of
conditional and unconditional cash transfer grants; (ii) capacity building in
social safety net planning, administration and evaluation and (iii) project
management. The project will be implemented over a four-year period and will offer
partnership opportunities for interested donors.
According to the WB press release, ‘This is a novel
approach to social sector reform in the West Bank & Gaza... The Bank has
successfully supported conditional cash transfer approaches introduced in the last
ten years in many other parts of the world, like Latin America and Turkey,
where their efficiency has been proven in mitigating the effects of
vulnerability in particular as regards poor children.’
‘Conditional cash transfers are targeted grants for qualifying
poor families, enabling them to pay the out-of-pocket costs of keeping their
children in school and to make regular preventive visits to health clinics. In
the West Bank & Gaza, SHC parents will not only have to ensure their
children go to school and receive proper healthcare, but will also be required
to attend awareness-raising training courses as the conditions for continuing
to receive the cash assistance.’
‘The Bank has been active in the West Bank &Gaza for
the past ten years, adapting its operations to the prevailing political climate
from reconstruction to institution building, and since September 2000 to
emergency assistance. As with all recent Bank emergency operations in the
Palestinian territories, the Social Safety Net Reform Project aims at providing
immediate relief and preventing further loss of human capital while supporting
the PA’s efforts to achieve sustainable social development in the long run.’
3 Social protection in ‘post-conflict’ and transitional states
3.1 Vulnerable groups and targeted assistance in the aftermath of war
Levels and types of vulnerability in the aftermath of such
situations (‘post-conflict’, ‘transition’, ‘recovery’ phases) depend in large
part on the nature and duration of the conflict, its effects on people and
structures, and the way in which the conflict has ended. Destruction of
physical infrastructure may be a major factor. Political instability associated
with new, weakened or contested governance structures is common, and may be
accompanied by continuing insecurity, lawlessness, even anarchy (Somalia). More
generally, state systems and structures are typically disrupted, sometimes with
major loss of trained staff and other resources. At the community level,
conflict may leave in its wake social fragmentation and tension. The
demobilisation of troops or return of displaced populations creates competition
for available resources, jobs, land; and makes greater demands on weakened
services.
Conflict creates new forms of poverty and social
exclusion. Demobilised troops may come to constitute an underclass and a source
of potential macro and micro-insecurity (Harris, Lewis and dos Santos in Harris
ed., 1999). According to the ILO (1995), the major problems faced by
demobilised combatants relate to alienation from civilian life; inadequate
information and counselling; problems of land availability and allocation; and
problems of finding stable livelihood and employment options.
Successful reintegration of ex-combatants is said to
depend on the motivation of the individual, the acceptance and support of the
community, and measures provided for employment and income generation. Progress
on other areas of public policy, and particularly land reform issues, may be
key to determining the success of reintegration programmes (see for example
Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, 1994, on reintegration in El Salvador; and more
generally Collier, 1994). Various specific social protection measures,
including vocational skills training and demobilisation allowances, are likely
to be essential to successful reintegration. In this regard, Srivastava (1994,
p.10) notes that ‘Evidence suggests that demobilisation allowances for one year
would be the minimum required in most countries’.
Another key vulnerable group in the situations under
consideration are refugees and internally displaced people, as they return to
their country or places of origin. Here
the issues of social exclusion are likely to relate to the original reasons for
flight, the conditions on return, and whether people are able to return to
their original home and land. Rogge (1994, p.34 – cited in Harris, ed.) argues
that the effectiveness of economic readjustment and reintegration by refugees
depends on a number of variables:
1. The length of time a returnee has spent in
exile;
2. The level of self-sufficiency or dependency
he/she experienced in exile;
3. The skills of knowledge he/she acquired while
in exile;
4. Income-generating opportunities or means of
production available in home areas;
5. The amount of individual or zonal reintegration
assistance provided;
6. The degree of voluntariness in his/her
repatriation; and
7. The individual’s commitment and/or tenacity
to re-establish themselves.
Rogge notes that returnees may
find themselves reintegrating into a radically different political-economic
system from that which existed before exile, or from that to which the returnee
has adjusted during exile. Young adults in particular, unused to agricultural
work after years in refugee settlements, may choose to return to urban areas – often
with little prospect of employment. More generally, Forman and Salomons
(undated) caution that ‘care must be taken to avoid the perception of serving
the needs of the returnee population to the exclusion of the local inhabitants’
– a caveat that applies as much to situations involving return after internal
displacement as return of refugees. For reintegration to succeed, recovery
efforts must include the entire community, allowing that the returnees may have
specific needs e.g. relating to disruption of livelihoods or loss of assets
including land and other property.
Targeted assistance is likely to focus on the social
protection needs of particular groups, notably widows, orphaned children, and
people disabled by war or by landmines. Levels of disability in particular are
frequently very high in the aftermath of conflict, and the consequences for the
individuals concerned are likely to include limited employment and livelihood
options, and various manifestations of social exclusion. In some cases, but by
no means all, rehabilitation services may be available. Compensation schemes
may be available to disabled ex-combatants in some cases, but this is not the
norm (ILO, 1995).
The advantages and problems associated with targeting
social assistance have been much debated (see Devereux, 2002 for an account of
the main arguments). In the post-conflict context, new layers of complexity are
added to the problem of identifying and targeting assistance to vulnerable
groups. Shifting populations and the lack of reliable data are one aspect of
this. Humanitarian relief assistance and emergency service provision tend to be
based on geographically-defined criteria (generally the regions worst affected
by conflict), further defined in some cases by demographic or social categories,
including those described above. The rationale for such schemes may be
multi-faceted: while the core rationale may relate to such aims as ensuring
food security, nutrition and health across the target population, this is
frequently complemented by social and political objectives, including a desire
to ensure political stability and to ‘knit’ populations fractured by war (as
for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
As Devereux observes (ibid.
p.3), there are political risks to targeting deriving from the resentment of
those who are excluded, and these risks are likely to be compounded in
post-conflict environments. This would tend to indicate forms of welfare
provision that are, in general, broad-based rather than narrowly targeted.
3.2 Post-conflict humanitarian action and welfare safety nets
The question of how to construct the social protection
agenda in the aftermath of conflict, and what relative weighting to give it in
the allocation of resources and setting of policy priorities, is a matter of
some debate. Given the analysis above – that the need for protection may be as
great or even greater in the aftermath of formal hostilities – the imperative
to restore effective basic services and ensure basic food security as a matter
of priority is not in doubt. How this should be managed, and what forms of
vulnerability should be recognised through special safety-net arrangements, is
less clear. So too is the relationship between the humanitarian relief – which
typically continues beyond the cessation of formal hostilities – and social
protection mechanisms. The often dilapidated state of government services in
the aftermath of conflict complicates these issues, as does the urgent
requirement for radical macro-economic and governance reform. While these transitions
may be externally supported and heavily subsidised in the short-term,
constraints on public expenditure and the problem of raising adequate revenue
from taxes may give little scope for generous public welfare provision in the
medium term. In many contexts, high levels of risk – to people themselves, to
humanitarian workers, to state and commercial enterprise, etc. – are posed by
continuing violent insecurity, making transition difficult to achieve.
In the short term, international humanitarian assistance
may provide a more or less adequate safety net. Levels of funding, especially
to countries undergoing protracted crisis or transition from crisis in
Sub-Saharan Africa, are often grossly inadequate to the task. Even in those
cases that receive greater international attention, the transition phase poses
real dilemmas and exposes the conceptual and operational gulf between relief
and development approaches. As Christoplos (2004) notes, ‘The interface between
social protection and humanitarian action is currently relatively uncharted
territory... The lack of clarity in terminology related to rehabilitation,
recovery, reconstruction, etc. stems partially from a failure to define how
humanitarianism, social protection and growth relate to one another with respect
to values and operational priorities.’
Social protection must be understood as an inextricable
part of the social/political ‘contract’. The formulation and implementation of
social policy is politically determined in ways that are problematic, even anathema,
to humanitarians. This, says Christoplos, ‘suggests uncomfortable questions
regarding the efficacy of maintaining a strict division between politics and
saving lives...’ While general principles of equity and non-discrimination may
guide policy, the demands of impartial response to need may be impossible to
meet through rudimentary or run down public services, even after a sustained
period of investment and recovery.
In the particular case of Afghanistan, Christoplos notes
that a number of different arguments were made to justify the expansion of
social protection structures:
·
Social protection represents an agenda for
making a smooth transition from the chaotic and haphazard collection of
humanitarian projects to a more reliable and regularised system that protects
the population as a whole;
·
The negative impacts of certain forms of
humanitarian assistance (e.g., food aid) can be addressed if programming is
placed in a more regularised structure under the leadership of the government;
·
Social protection is an agenda that can
strengthen the legitimacy of the state by allowing it to re-shoulder its
responsibilities for ensuring the basic survival of its citizens;
·
As a country prone to natural disasters and high
levels of seasonal stress, Afghanistan needs a system with which to respond to
the needs of disaster-affected people; and
·
Rural people are perceived as shifting to opium
production in response to acute livelihood stress, and a social protection
system is therefore seen to be an important component of a counter-narcotics
strategy.
He goes on ‘Most importantly, it is clear that a
significant proportion of the population faces a structural deficit of assets
by which to meet basic livelihood needs. Even if the most optimistic
projections of the international community hold, there will still be a
significant number of people experiencing extreme hardship every year. If the
Afghan state (rather than the international community) is to manage its
responsibilities for the basic survival of its citizens, an institutionally
sustainable safety net is needed. If it fails to do so, the government’s social
contract with its citizens will be profoundly flawed.’ Concerns are being
raised, says Christoplos, about the untenable nature of the present status quo
of organisational roles in protection of livelihoods.
In a policy paper entitled “From Humanitarian Assistance
to Social Protection” (2002), the Afghan Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and
Development (MRRD) envisages a shift from humanitarian to ‘more stable modalities’
involving first a shift of responsibilities from the international community to
the government. It will also demand a shift from providing support to loosely
defined sets of beneficiaries, consisting of ‘vulnerable groups’ and disaster
victims to the use of much more refined targeting tools – a common
preoccupation in the design of social protection mechanisms, but one which can
lead to exclusion and inflexibility, and to schemes that are costly to
administer (Devereux 2002).
The MRRD argues that currently “Accountability is blurred.
In the eyes of most Afghans, the government is responsible for social
protection, but is not seen to be playing a leadership role in respect to
humanitarian resources. As a result, accountability is not clear if things go
wrong” (MRRD 2002:3).’ Christoplos notes that ‘while overall data collection
regarding vulnerability is certainly improving rapidly, the capacity of the
government to manage transparent and non-politicised inter-community targeting
at field level remains limited.’
3.3 Managing post-war transitions
The dimension of social capital that relates to state
institutions and their ability to function (organisational
integrity), which includes the legal environment and social norms, has a
major bearing on the provision of social protection. According to Colletta
& Cullen, ‘The degree of the state’s integrity influences whether civil
society complements (enhances) or substitutes for state services and
functions.’ In contexts like Afghanistan and Iraq, in which social protection
must be considered against the backdrop of a process of wholesale
reconstruction of the state and its institutions, a fundamental weakness of
state integrity is likely to constitute the reality in the short and medium
terms.
Any social protection strategy that ignores this reality
is likely to fail in its objectives. This implies the need for transitions
planned over several years, and a degree of commitment to protracted engagement
from international agencies and donors that cannot be taken for granted. It
also implies a high degree of flexibility and willingness to adapt approaches
to changing circumstances. Uncertain donor commitment, and the pressure for new
regimes to establish their political legitimacy, may lead to ill-conceived
transitions that leave social protection issues largely unaddressed.
Continuing violent insecurity may be another reality. The
recent withdrawal (July 2004) of the international medical agency MSF from
Afghanistan after five of its staff were killed illustrates the difficulty of
maintaining services in dangerously insecure environments, even when those
services are provided by neutral humanitarian agencies operating in notionally
‘post-conflict’ situations. Agencies and individuals (nationals or
internationals) perceived to be working for the national government or aligned
to the policies of international donor governments are at particular risk from
armed opposition groups. The UN and its agencies have been specifically
targeted. The resulting contraction of ‘humanitarian space’ is a matter of
great concern in Afghanistan, Iraq and other similar contexts (Donini, 2004),
and one that has serious implications for the provision of basic social as well
as physical protection.
3.3.1 Relief-development transitions
The much-debated relationship between relief and
development approaches, while largely beyond the scope of this paper, has
obvious relevance to the social protection agenda. To some extent, this relates
to the question of sustainability. As Macrae et al. point out (1995) ‘The criteria applied to planning relief
operations are primarily concerned with the physical survival of individuals;
development activities are planned with respect to the sustainability and
appropriateness of social and economic systems. These two categories of
objective cannot be easily reconciled by the concept of ‘rehabilitation’’.
The issues here relate in part to the objectives of relief
and development strategies, and the timeframes within which they are conceived;
and in part to the means by which they are pursued. Some of these issues have
been noted above. Colletta & Cullen (2000:76) argue that ‘...additive
rather than substitutional strategies are the preferred course of action during
the transition from emergency to development.’ While this seems to represent a
majority view, many of the questions noted above about the absence of state
capacity remain unanswered in specific contexts.
[For further discussion of the link between relief and
development approaches, and the increasing linkage to security agendas, see the
forthcoming HPG report ‘Beyond the Continuum: the changing role of aid policy
in protracted crisis’ (ed. Macrae & Harmer]
3.3.2 Multiple transitions
Research conducted on post-conflict environments in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Naqvi et
al., undated) considers the question of social protection in states that
are recovering from recent conflict and which are, at the same time, undergoing
radical political and economic transformation. Socialist systems that virtually
guaranteed employment and which made generous welfare provision for those
unable to work have been replaced with political economies in which public
expenditure is much more tightly controlled, and where levels of unemployment
are not matched by equivalent social security schemes. Low administrative
capacity and high levels of bureaucratic corruption are common features of such
transitional states.
Naqvi et al.
conclude that fundamental policy reform is a priority in the window of
opportunity that presents itself in the aftermath of war. At the top of the
list of reforms, they argue, should be measures to promote the key social
protection objective of maximising job creation, because ‘the fiscal and
administrative capacity to sustain even a well-targeted social protection system
is likely to be limited’. Central to this, the authors argue, is reform of
labour policy and legislation to allow maximum flexibility within the formal
labour market while complying with core labour standards – recognising the
significance of the informal economy in such contexts. Coordination of donor
policy and programming is essential to achieve these ends. So too are pubic
awareness campaigns, informing people of their entitlements, managing
expectations, and helping dispel myths of favouritism.
These arguments might be said to be applicable, with
variations, to many other post-conflictual states, where political and economic
transformation is a common theme.
3.3.3 The International Financial Institutions and countries in transition from conflict
As noted above, the World Bank has defined for itself a
role in “countries in transition from conflict”, supporting recovery and
development with particular attention to the needs of vulnerable war-affected
groups.
Carlin (2003) notes that after an absence of 23 years, the
Bank and the IMF re-engaged in Afghanistan in 2001. By 2003 (within 2 years of
the Bonn agreement), the Bank was financing a US$60 million health sector
programme, 80% of which will be delivered by NGOS. Establishing a serious
health effort in Cambodia took more than twice as long. This improved
responsiveness was contingent upon a willingness to contract with non-state
actors, and a rapid procurement strategy to support this. But critics
questioned the sustainability of health care systems and the level of
investment the Bank had made in strategic approaches to welfare provision.
There is recognition that there needs to be more scrutiny
of the actual practice and dynamics of civil society organisations (CSOs) in
specific contexts (World Bank 2002). One of the inherent problems of CSOs is that
they are not able to provide an overall framework for service delivery and
monitoring at the national level. Therefore the advantage of individual CSOs in
delivering services cannot be aggregated to a national advantage in terms of an
entire health or education sector. More generally, differentiating between
state circumstances – for example the development of Interim PRSPs in ‘post’
conflict situations – have a particular set of issues and challenges which the
Bank is yet to systematically respond to (World Bank 2002).
Much of the Bank’s work on social service delivery in
crises has been informed by lessons gained from the response to East Asia
financial crises, especially in Indonesia, and from evaluations of social funds
and safety nets that were linked to adjustment programs and/or economic crises.
In other words, very little of their learning thus far is from
conflict-affected or transitional environments. Lessons from Indonesia indicate
that the Bank faced significant challenges targeting vulnerable populations –
primarily hampered by lack of up-to-date, complete and accurate information. It
also faced challenges in administration and its financing was exposed to
political manipulation at both national and local levels. Experiences with
different channels for the provision of social services including, governments,
international NGOs, community based organisations, and the private sector, has
had mixed results.
Studies conducted on the impacts of the Fund’s structural
adjustment policies on the level social sector investments have thrown up some
interesting results. The Independent Evaluations Office report on “Fiscal Adjustment in IMF-Supported Programs” (IEO,
IMF, 2003) found that on average the presence of a
Fund-supported program did not reduce social spending. Rather, the presence of
a programme was associated with increased public spending in health and
education – measured as either a share of GDP, total spending, or in real terms
compared with a situation without a program. It did note however that the
positive effects attributable to the program were short-lived.
3.3.4 Social protection and post-war recovery
The relationship between social protection and economic
recovery (growth) presents a paradox. On the one hand, reform of public
expenditure policies would appear to demand tight control of social
expenditure. On the other hand, it is argued that investment in social capital
is a necessary driver of growth. The findings of a recent study (World Bank, 2002)
suggest that in terms of policy reform priorities for growth, social policy is
relatively more important than macro-economic policy in post-conflict and
transitional settings. The study notes that if opportunities exist for modest
trade-offs that improve social policies at the expense of deterioration in
macro-balances, growth is, on average, improved. Thus relative to the normal
post-conflict strategies adopted, social policy needs to be assigned a higher
priority. The findings raise the question: why should social policies have a
higher impact in stimulating economic growth in post-conflict countries?
(Especially since by their nature social interventions tend to produce results
in terms of high growth only in the long term). A possible explanation is that
an emphasis on social policies (and social inclusion) has a significant effect
in signalling the government or transitional administration’s commitment to
reconciliation and rehabilitation, which has knock on-effects in terms of
encouraging private capital flows (remittances, as well as private sector
investment) back into the country – both of which matter for growth (see World
Bank, 2003 & 2004).
4 Conclusions
Applying the concept of social protection to conflict
situations requires some adaptation of normal usage. In considering the issue
of individual and household security in such contexts, a range of
vulnerabilities and risks must be considered that goes beyond the economic.
Social protection approaches have to reckon with the often extreme damage done
to the social fabric in such contexts; and with the sometimes extreme
manifestations of social exclusion that characterise them.
The more immediate consequences of violent conflict may
include loss of household income and assets; disruption of markets; and
exposure to danger from violence or forced displacement. Those exposed to
protracted conflict may face the erosion of livelihoods requiring sometimes
radical adaptations, resort to damaging survival strategies, and (for some)
‘diversification’ into areas that may be dangerous, degrading or illegal –
including prostitution and drug production. For others, livelihoods may be more
resilient but yield a progressively lower income.
In the absence of government services, a heavy burden is
placed on non-formal service provision by civil society actors – and on
international humanitarian mechanisms. Depending on a variety of factors,
including access and political will, these provide a more or less adequate
basic welfare service for those who need it. Such services are often grossly
inadequate to the task. It is characteristic of such contexts that those who
escape them – as refugees across national boundaries – are likely to receive
more adequate and more sustained assistance. Asylum policy and social protection
in conflict situations are related issues. Within the conflict-affected area
itself, support to non-formal mechanisms may be one of the more effective forms
of intervention for social protection – allowing that their capacity and scope
will be limited, even where they have relatively greater scope for operating in
conditions of prevailing insecurity.
The social protection agenda in conflict situations
centres on attempts to sustain life and minimally adequate living conditions.
In the aftermath of armed conflict, the damage caused and the level of
continuing insecurity may determine both the need for social protection, and
the scope for providing it. Transitions from ‘parallel’ or ‘substitutory’
relief approaches to more sustainable approaches to service provision have
proved difficult to achieve in many cases; not least because of the problem of
building the capacity of public service providers (and of the related
governance structures) while ensuring the continued provision of essential
services. The existence of strong and stable central government seems to be the
key variable here, along with the willingness of international donors and
financial institutions to pursue strategies that allow for such transitions in
realistic (often medium-term) timeframes, and are sufficiently flexible to
allow for fluctuating conditions.
Apart from its intrinsic social protection rationale,
there is some evidence to suggest that in the short- and medium-term,
investment in social policy is also essential to promoting growth in
post-conflict and transitional states. Situations like that in Afghanistan
would also seem to suggest that it is essential to the maintenance of political
stability and the re-forging of the social contract.
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[1]
See for example Holzmann, R. and Jorgensen, S. (1999). For a range of
definitions, see main paper.
[2] Whether a situation constitutes
‘armed conflict’ such that it is covered by the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 or of the Additional Protocols of 1977 depends on whether
it involves a certain (undefined) level and intensity of violence. Such
situations are distinguished in international humanitarian law from ‘internal
disturbances and tensions’, including riots and situations involving sporadic
and isolated acts of violence (Protocol II, Art. 1.2). ‘War’ itself has no
legal definition.
[3] In this regard, it should be noted
that the relatively wealthier may have more, and better, flight options than
poorer people; and more generally, that wealth can in some circumstances buy protection.
[4] These propositions need to be tested
in each case. As Longley and Christopolos point out (2004), the extent of
disruption may be less than expected in any given context.
[5] On the social impact of war, see
Lewis, N. in Harris (1999). On the more general cost of armed conflict, see
paper by Harris in the same collection.
[6] See, for example, Additional Protocol
II of 1977, article 18. The general rule is that consent is not to be withheld.
[7] Darcy (1997). Under Article 11 of the
ICESCR, States Parties ‘recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard
of living ... including adequate food, clothing and housing...’. Article 12
recognizes ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health...’. While the obligation on the state
is to take steps ‘to the maximum of its available resources’, and through
international cooperation, to achieve the progressive fulfillment of these
rights, the rights themselves are not conditional.
[8] See in particular 1977 Additional
Protocol II, Art.14
[9] It cannot be assumed, in any given
context, that remittances are received by or benefit poorer families (Nicholas
Haan, FAO Somalia, personal communication, 30 July 2004). This is a generally under-researched area,
and one on which ODI/HPG is considering a collaborative research initiative for
2005.
[10] For this and other material in this
paper relating to the World Bank and IMF’s role in social protection, the
author is indebted to Adele Harmer, Research Fellow at ODI. See also Chapter 1
of the forthcoming HPG report ‘Beyond the Continuum: the changing role of aid
policy in protracted crisis’ (Macrae & Harmer). See also Chapter 1 of the
forthcoming HPG report ‘Beyond the Continuum: the changing role of aid policy
in protracted crisis’ (Macrae & Harmer)
[11] OP
2.30 Development
Cooperation and Conflict. To signal the shift in emphasis the previously
named Post Conflict Unit was renamed the Conflict
Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit.
